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Constitutional Dimensions of the Judicial 
Restitution of Wrongfully Expropriated 
Property in Poland 
LESZEK BOSEK0F∗  
 KATARZYNA KRÓLIKOWSKA1F∗2F∗   
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of post-war property nationalization and its possible res-
titution is important for all Central Eastern European countries, but defi-
nitely holds a special significance for Poland. This article deals with the 
legal difficulties associated with restituting property and receiving com-
pensation for property taken in the process of mass nationalization by the 
communist state in Poland after World War II. The post-war Communist 
government’s decision3F1 to nationalize property was executed under spe-
cial nationalization laws and decrees4F2 and on the basis of administrative 
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 1. The most severe laws on nationalization of whole branches of industry were adopted in 
the period of 1944 to 1947 by the Homeland National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa or”KRN”) 
that was a parliament-like communist-controlled political body created during the later period of 
World War II, accepted and to a large extent controlled by the Soviet Union, and by the Polish 
Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego or”PKWN”), which 
was a provisional government proclaimed on July 22, 1944 that exercised control over Polish ter-
ritory retaken from Nazi Germany under the Homeland National Council. 
 2. The following legislative acts were enacted by the communist regime to nationalize the 
following kinds of property in Poland: Dekret z 6 września 1944 r. w sprawie reformy rolnej i 
rozporządzenia wydane na podstawie dekretu [Decree of September 6, 1944 on Agrarian Reform 
and Regulation Issued Pursuant to the Decree] (1945 Dz. U. nr. 3 poz. 13) (Pol.); Dekret z dnia 28 
listopada 1945 r. o przejęciu niektórych nieruchomości ziemskich na cele reformy rolnej i osadnic-
twa [Decree of November28, 1945 on Takeover of Certain Landed Property for Purposes of Agrar-
ian and Land Reform] (1945 Dz. U. nr. 57 poz. 321) (Pol.); Dekret z dnia 27 lipca 1949 r. o przejęciu 
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decisions issued after the war by competent administrative bodies. The 
state (social) property was further enlarged on a statutory basis.5F3                    
 
na własność Państwa niepozostających w faktycznym władaniu właścicieli nieruchomości 
ziemskich, położonych w niektórych powiatach województwa białostockiego, lubelskiego, 
rzeszowskiego i krakowskiego [Decree of July 27, 1949 on Takeover of Ownership of Landed 
Property Not in Actual Possession of Their Owners, Located in Certain Poviats of the Białostockie, 
Lubelskie, Rzeszowskie and Krakowskie Voivodships] (1949 Dz. U. nr. 46 poz. 339) (Pol.) (agri-
cultural land); Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z dnia 12 grudnia 1944 r. o 
przejęciu niektórych lasów na własność Skarbu Państwa [Decree of December12, 1944 on Takeo-
ver by the State Treasury of Ownership of Certain Forests] (1944 Dz. U. nr. 15 poz. 82) (Pol.) 
(forestry); Ustawa z dnia 3 stycznia 1946 r. o przejęciu na własność Państwa podstawowych gałęzi 
gospodarki narodowej [Law of January3, 1946 on Nationalization of Core Branches of the National 
Economy] (1946 Dz. U. nr. 3 poz. 17) (Pol.) (large and medium industry, whole branches); Dekret 
z dnia 13 listopada 1945 r. o utworzeniu przedsiębiorstwa państwowego “Film Polski” [Decree of 
November 13, 1945 on Establishment of “Film Polski” State Enterprise] (1945 Dz. U. nr. 55 poz. 
308) (Pol.); Ustawa z dnia 8 stycznia 1951 r. o przejęciu aptek na własność Państwa [Law of Jan-
uary8, 1951 on Nationalization of Pharmacies] (1951 Dz. U. nr. 1 poz. 1) (Pol.); Dekret z dnia 8 
marca 1946 r. o majątkach opuszczonych i poniemieckich [Decree of March 8, 1946 on Abandoned 
and Ex-German Property] (1946 Dz. U. nr. 13 poz. 87) (Pol.); Dekret z dnia 6 września 1946 r. o 
ustroju rolnym i osadnictwie na obszarze Ziem Odzyskanych i byłego Wolnego Miasta Gdańska 
[Decree of September 6, 1946 on the Agricultural System and Settlement in Regained Territories 
and the Former Free City of Gdansk] (1946 Dz. U. nr. 49 poz. 279) (Pol.); Dekret z dnia 7 kwietnia 
1948 r. o wywłaszczeniu majątków zajętych na cele użyteczności publicznej w okresie wojny 1939-
1945 r [Decree of April 7, 1948 on Expropriation of Estates Occupied for Purposes of Public Utility 
During the 1939-1945 War] (1948 Dz. U. nr. 20 poz. 138) (Pol.); Ustawa z dnia 20 marca 1950 r. 
o przejęciu przez Państwo dóbr martwej ręki, poręczeniu proboszczom posiadania gospodarstw 
rolnych i utworzeniu Funduszu Kościelnego [Law of March 20, 1950 on Nationalization of Mort-
main Property, Entrusting Farm Land to Parish Priests, and Creation of the Church Fund] (1950 
Dz. U. nr. 9 poz. 87) (Pol.); Dekret z dnia 26 października 1945 r. o własności i użytkowaniu 
gruntów na obszarze m. st. Warszawy [Decree on the Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw of 
October26, 1945] (1945 Dz. U. nr. 50 poz. 279) (Pol.), [the so-called “Bierut Decree”] (selected 
branches of industry); Obwieszczenie Ministra Gospodarki Komunalnej z dnia 3 września 1968 r. 
w sprawie ogłoszenia jednolitego tekstu ustawy z dnia 22 kwietnia 1959 r. o remontach i odbudo-
wie oraz o wykańczaniu budowy i nadbudowie budynków [Law of April 22, 1959 on Renovation, 
Reconstruction, Finishing and Expansion of buildings] (1959 Dz. U. nr. 36 poz. 249) (Pol.); Dekret 
z dnia 2 lutego 1955 r. o przejęciu taboru żeglugi śródlądowej na własność Państwa [Decree of 
February 2, 1955 on Nationalization of Inland Shipping Stock] (1955 Dz. U. nr. 6 poz. 36) (Pol.) 
(urban properties); Ustawa z dnia 30 maja 1962 r- Prawo wodne [Law of March 3, 1962 – The 
Water Act] (1962 Dz U. no. 34 poz. 158) (Pol.) (water resources). 
 3. See, e.g., Ustawa z dnia 25 lutego 1958 r. o uregulowaniu stanu prawnego mienia pozos-
tającego pod zarządem państwowym [Law of February 25, 1958 on Regulating the Legal Status of 
Property Remaining under State Administration] (1958 Dz. U. no. 11 poz. 37) (Pol.); Dekret z dnia 
18 kwietnia 1955 r. o uwłaszczeniu i o uregulowaniu innych spraw, związanych z reformą rolną i 
osadnictwem rolnym [Decree of April 18, 1955 on Enfranchisement and Regulation of Other Mat-
ters Relating to Agrarian Reform and Agricultural Settlement] (1955 Dz. U. no. 18 poz. 107) (Pol.); 
Ustawa z dnia 13 lipca 1957 r. o zmianie dekretu z dnia 18 kwietnia 1955 r. o uwłaszczeniu i o 
uregulowaniu innych spraw, związanych z reformą rolną i osadnictwem rolnym [Act of July 13, 
1957 Amending the Decree of April 18, 1955 on Enfranchisement and the Regulation of Other 
Matters Related to Land Reform and Agricultural Settlement] (1957 Dz. U. no. 39 poz. 174) (Pol.); 
Obwieszczenie Ministra Rolnictwa, Leśnictwa i Gospodarki Żywnościowej z dnia 20 października 
1989 r. w sprawie ogłoszenia jednolitego tekstu ustawy z dnia 12 marca 1958 r. o sprzedaży nieru-
chomości Państwowego Funduszu Ziemi oraz uporządkowaniu niektórych spraw związanych z 
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The Polish legal system allows for restitution and compensation in the 
so-called “judicial privatization” process of the nationalized property6F4 
(i.e., within the boundaries of the ordinary judicial system of the country 
using typical legal institutions and concepts of domestic private and ad-
ministrative law). 
The legal situation in Poland allows this kind of spontaneous resti-
tution, which other post-communist countries avoided by creating cen-
tralized systems or strategic plans for the return of properties or concern-
ing compensation. Poland has not enacted general legislation containing 
a comprehensive program to address the regulation of nationalized Com-
munist-era private property.7F5 Since 1990, attempts have been made at 
regulating the matter with appropriate legal acts8F6 and a number of bills 
have been proposed.9F7  
  
 
przeprowadzeniem reformy rolnej i osadnictwa rolnego [Announcement of the Minister of Agri-
culture, Forestry and Food Economy of Oct. 20, 1989 Regarding the Publication of a Uniform Text 
of the Act of March 12, 1958 on the Sale of Real Estate of the National Land Fund and the Ordering 
of Certain Matters Related to the Implementation of Land Reform and Agricultural Settlement] 
(1989 Dz. U. no. 58 poz. 348) (Pol.). 
 4. The terms were first used by the Supreme Court of Poland. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme 
Court] II CSK 498/12, June 12, 2013 (Pol.). 
 5. For experiences of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, see Frances H. Foster, Restitution of 
Expropriated Property: Post Soviet Lessons for Cuba, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 621, 656 
(1996). For an example of the first studies regarding property restitution and transitional justice on 
post-communist societies, see Vojtéch Cepl, A Note on the Restitution of Property in Post-Com-
munist Czechoslovakia, 7 J. COMMUNIST STUD. 368 (1991). 
 6. The only exception is legislation passed concerning restitution allowing for the claiming 
of the property of the Catholic Church and other churches as well as of confiscated Jewish commu-
nal property, such as synagogues and schools. Poland has passed legislation on communal property 
returns affecting communal claims. Still, so far no general restitution law regulates the terms, 
method, and procedure for the privatization (“restitution”) of and compensation for property taken 
from natural persons and legal entities by the socialist government after 1944 on the territory of the 
Polish state, which was then transferred into state or cooperative property in the socialist economy. 
 7. See William R. Youngblood, Poland’s Struggle for a Restitution Policy in the 1990’s, 9 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 645 (1995). The Polish Government is still creating draft restitution laws to 
address at least some communist takings, id. 
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The drafts of these bills were connected with the debate on how to com-
bine restitution with the ongoing privatization process10F8 and housing pri-
vatization.11F9 There was no standard model for the privatization process in 
post-communist countries since every country followed different meth-
ods of privatization, adapting to the economic and social circumstances 
specific to each country. From that perspective, returning the property to 
all or some groups of former owners whose property was nationalized 
during communism was only one of the applied models of privatization.12F10 
On the other hand, an interesting remark draws attention to the fact that 
Poland’s failure to pass a reprivatization bill may be explained, at least in 
part, by the atypical strength of trade unions which represented distribu-
tive justice arguments against restitution.13F11 
This article is focused on the judicial reprivatization of nationalized 
property in Poland where, due to the fact that a comprehensive national 
restitution law has not been enacted, claimants proceed on an individual 
basis by filing administrative and civil court actions to recover lost prop-
erty. From a legal point of view, there is one important difference be-
tween judicial and statutory restitution, namely that the nationalization is 
not illegal in itself and no act of parliament declares nationalization ille-
gal in Poland. This fact has a profound impact on the scope of judicial 
reprivatization and the margin of appreciation of the judges. Since the 
collapse of the socialist regime in 1989-1990, it is possible to bring civil 
 
 8. Due to privatization plans, Poland’s restitution schemes seemed to favor privatization as 
the central means of raising funds to satisfy property claims. Through privatizations, most large 
properties would be sold to private enterprises; thus, the original owners would only receive com-
pensation for lost properties. The Polish privatization scheme would raise funds primarily via sell-
ing some companies by public tender or initial public offerings. The main priority seems to be 
privatizing large industries to promote foreign and domestic investment in the Polish industrial 
sector. See Beata Pasek, East European Nations Swamped by Post-Communist Restitution Claims 
Economics, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1999, at A4. 
 9. Housing often presents problems with restitution schemes where current sitting tenants 
are allowed to buy out the property. As a result, the former owners may only be eligible for com-
pensation. A different approach was adopted, for instance, in the Czech Republic, where propriety 
was given to the restitution claims. See Martin Lux & Martina Mikeszova, Property Restitution and 
Private Rental Housing in Transition: The Case of the Czech Republic, 27(1) HOUSING STUDIES 
77-96 (2012). For an explanation of how housing reforms and property restitution are intertwined, 
see SASCHA TSENKOVA, HOUSING POLICY REFORMS IN POST-SOCIALIST EUROPE: LOST IN 
TRANSITION (2009); Peter Marcuse, Privatization and Its Discontents: Property Rights in Land 
and Housing in Eastern Europe, in CITIES AFTER SOCIALISM: URBAN AND REGIONAL CHANGE 
AND CONFLICT IN POST-SOCIALIST SOCIETIES 175 (Gregory Andrusz et al. eds., 1996). 
 10. See HAXHI GASHI, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
STATE/SOCIAL PROPERTY: PRIVATIZATION AND RESTITUTION IN THE POST-COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES – KOSOVO AS A SUI GENERIS CASE OF PRIVATIZATION (2013). 
 11. See Anna Gelpern, The Laws and Politics of Reprivatization in East-Central Europe: A 
Comparison, 14 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 315, 331 (1993). 
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and administrative actions before Polish courts to seek restitution of im-
properly nationalized property or for compensation thereof. Only real 
confiscations are subject to judicial privatization (i.e., restitution); that is, 
only those takings that were not justified at that time in the wording and 
context of legal acts on nationalization and exceeded the limits and pre-
requisites for mass expropriation. In this sense, under judicial reprivati-
zation, restitution and compensation are being decided on a case-by-case 
basis, which is why the whole process is also called “decentralized repri-
vatization.”14F12 
It must be stressed that judicial reprivatization of nationalized prop-
erty is still one of the most complex issues in contemporary Polish prop-
erty and constitutional law, thus raising many legal and policy questions. 
The courts do not have the competence and legitimacy to pursue a policy 
of “retroactive justice.” The term “retroactive justice” was first used in a 
Hungarian Constitutional Court ruling allowing statutes of limitations to 
be extended in order to prosecute specific crimes that occurred under 
communism.15F13 Nevertheless, “retroactive justice” is used broadly to ap-
ply to all applications of historical justice considerations, while “transi-
tional justice” refers more narrowly to justice considerations regarding a 
prior regime. Therefore, the term “transitional justice” is more suitable 
since retroactive justice policies inherently reflect an acknowledgement 
of a moral, but not legal, obligation held collectively by groups (i.e., na-
tions), and need a legal basis in the form of special restitution or reprivat-
ization laws enacted by the parliament.16F14 Without that collective obliga-
tion being expressed in an act of parliament, there is no justification for 
any restitution policies that burden citizens, because there is not the same 
feeling of responsibility for previous harm. Because of this, neither the 
Supreme Court nor the Supreme Administrative Court of Poland want to 
substitute themselves in place of the democratically elected legislators. 
Their openness to reversing the injustices of the nationalization process 
does not change the fact that the courts try to maintain an independent 
 
 12. See Ewa Łętowska, Orzecznictwo sądowe jako instrument reprywatyzacji zdekoncentro-
wanej, in STUDIA I ANALIZY SĄDU NAJWYŻSZEGO. MATERIAŁY NAUKOWE “REPRYWATYZACJA 
W ORZECZNICTWIE SĄDÓW” MATERIAŁY Z KONFERENCJI NAUKOWEJ WARSZAWA, SĄD 
NAJWYŻSZY 85-96 (Mateusz Pilich ed.) (2016). 
 13. See Krisztina Morvai, Retroactive Justice based on International Law: A Recent Decision 
by The Hungarian Constitutional Court, in Transitional Justice 661 (Neil J. Kritz ed.) (1995). 
 14. See Peter Paczolay, Judicial Review of Compensation Law in Hungary, in TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE 669 (Neil Kritz ed.) (1995) (describing that with a collective moral obligation, citizens of 
a given country feel responsible for the actions of their country, even if the wrongs were committed 
under a prior government, because they were conducted under the auspices of the country). 
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attitude towards the issue by refraining from pro-reprivatization interpre-
tations of law and from directly or indirectly undermining the effects of 
the nationalization laws. 
Therefore, the purpose of this article is to analyze the current situa-
tion, in which classical judicial means are preferred for restitution and 
reprivatization, and to examine the constitutional problems that arise in 
connection with transitional justice in this matter. The reasons for the 
process are described, as well as the methods currently used to settle 
revindication and reprivatization of property. The article concludes that a 
restitution process based on judicial reprivatization is limited and this fea-
ture of the scheme is exacerbated with time. After twenty-eight years of 
transition, the courts deciding individual cases must implement constitu-
tional values relating to the principles of legal certainty and security, pro-
tection of legitimate expectations and the sense of common good. Lastly, 
it shows how courts have in recent years dealt with the inevitable conse-
quences of the lapse of time in restitution cases. 
II. THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REPRIVATIZATION 
Unlike in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe, reprivati-
zation in Poland comes down to judicial review of the correctness of the 
decisions issued in the past with regard to post-war nationalization laws 
and decrees. Any obligation of the state may arise only in cases where the 
nationalization or expropriation was not lawful under the then valid law; 
a situation which, according to some estimates, would be true in almost 
thirty percent of cases.17F15 Each decree contained provisions relating to the 
nationalization of only one given type of property (i.e., agricultural prop-
erty). The administrative authorities were not authorized to extend the 
scope of application of a decree to cover other goods (i.e., cultural goods 
or other types of property not specifically stipulated in the decree). Any 
decision relating to such property can be declared invalid and should be 
annulled. On the other hand, any decision issued within those boundaries 
would be sustained. In line with the decrees, facts indicating that nation-
alized property was not used for the purpose declared in the nationaliza-
tion decree, like the rural reform, but used for other purposes, would not 
justify the claim for revindication of the property.18F16 
  
 
 15. See Karol Sobczak, Reprywatyzacja, Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego [REV. 
ECON. LITIG.] 8 (2000). 
 16. See, e.g.,Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] III CK 536/02 June 24, 2004 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court] III CK 536/02 Dec. 6, 2005 (Pol.); see also Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme 
Court] III CKN 1492/00, Feb. 13, 2003 (Pol.). 
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To date, there have been successful examples of property recovered 
or compensation granted as a result of court cases. For instance, the 
PKWN Decree of September 6, 1944 on Agrarian Reform applies to 
landed real estate properties in the ownership of physical persons or legal 
persons. They were immediately transferred in their entirety,19F17 without 
any compensation to the owners, into the ownership of the State Treasury 
for the purposes indicated in Article 1 of the Decree. Properties were des-
tined for the purposes of rural land reform if their total size exceeded 
either one hundred hectares of total area or fifty hectares of farming land. 
However, within the territory of the Voivodships of Poznan, Pomerania 
and Silesia the same applied to properties exceeding one hundred hectares 
of total area, regardless of the proportion of farming land they contained. 
The law has thus been infringed upon when a procedure was not followed 
or when the property was not of the type permitted to be nationalized 
under the law. 
Any restitution attempt could be based on the nullity of the nation-
alization decision. As a general rule, the procedure does not differ from 
that applied to the return of other property wrongfully seized by the state 
on the grounds of an invalid administrative act. It is possible to challenge 
the validity of the regulation. Judicial reprivatization is carried out before 
two independent branches of the judiciary with the administrative courts 
having a prevailing role over the civil courts. The Supreme Court20F18 and 
the Supreme Administrative Court21F19 both rejected the idea of unifying the 
proceedings, thereby maintaining the dual path for seeking justice.22F20 
Thus, the main legal claim is brought before administrative bodies so that 
post-war administrative decisions can either be annulled or declared con-
trary to law. The administration authorities determine whether the prop-
erty was, in the past, taken in violation of one of the nationalization laws. 
 
 17. Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z dnia 6 września 1944 r. o 
przeprowadzeniu reform rolnej [Decree of September 6, 1944 on Agrarian Reform] (1944 Dz. U. 
nr. 4 poz.17) (Pol.). The PKWN Decree caused ex lege effects consisting of the transfer into the 
ownership of the State Treasury. This effect was somehow independent of whether on the day the 
Decree entered into force, the given parts of the territory of the state were already actually under 
the rule of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, or whether they still remained under Ger-
man occupation. The Decree mentioned some voivodeships, which were still under the German 
occupation in the days when the Decree on rural land reform was issued and published. 
 18. See, e.g.,Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] III CZP 121/10, Feb. 17, 2011 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court] III CZP 21/11, May 18, 2011 (Pol.) (according to this line of judicial 
decisions, the ordinary court is competent to rule on whether a property is subject to any of the 
nationalization laws only if the administrative competent institution or body denies its competence). 
See also Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] I CSK 752/13, Nov. 14, 2014 (Pol.). 
 19. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court] I OPS 3/10, Jan. 10, 
2011 (Pol.). 
 20. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal] P 107/08, Mar. 1, 2010 (Pol.). 
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Legal challenges to wrongful nationalization decisions or to decisions 
wrongfully refusing restitution are made pursuant to Articles 156, 157 
and 160 of the Polish Administrative Procedure Code (“PAPC”).23F21 Arti-
cle 156 Section 1 of the PAPC lists seven reasons to declare the adminis-
trative decision null and void.24F22 Pursuant to Article 156 Section 2 and 7 
of the PAPC, a public administration authority shall declare a decision 
invalid if, among other reasons, the decision has been issued without a 
legal basis or by grossly infringing the law, or if the decision contains a 
defect which renders the decision invalid by operation of law.25F23 
Nevertheless, there is one important statutory time cap, which 
makes the application for restitution in kind unsuccessful after a signifi-
cant passage of time. According to Article 156 Section 2 of the PACP, as 
a general rule, a wrongful decision, even that containing a defect which 
renders the decision invalid by operation of law, cannot be declared null 
and void only if a period of ten years has elapsed since the day the deci-
sion was served or pronounced or if the decision caused irreversible legal 
consequences.26F24 Article 158 of the PACP states that where a decision 
cannot be declared null and void because of the grounds laid out in Article 
156 Section 2 of the PACP, the decision may only be declared as “issued 
contrary to the law.”27F25 That means that restitution in kind is not possible 
since such a decision does not eliminate a wrongful decision and its bind-
ing effect, but it still allows compensation for wrongful administrative 
decisions that play a role in the compensation of damages. In other words, 
pursuant to the statutory provision it is always possible to launch admin-
istrative and compensatory procedures.28F26 
Nevertheless, there is a significant exception with no time limits for 
annulment when the final decision was issued without legal basis or with 
 
 21. Ustawa z dnia 14 czerwca 1960 [Act of June 14, 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure] 
arts. 156, 157, 160 (1960 Dz. U. no. 30 poz. 168) (Pol.) [hereinafter Polish Administrative Proce-
dure Code]. 
 22. Id. art. 156 (providing that an application to declare the administrative decision null and 
void shall be accepted by the organ which made it if the decision: (1) has been issued in breach of 
the rules governing competence, (2) has been issued without legal basis or with manifest breach of 
law, (3) concerns a case already decided by means of another final decision, (4) it has been ad-
dressed to a person who is not a party to the case, (5) was unenforceable at the day of issuance and 
has been unenforceable ever since, (6) its enforcement would effect in crime, (7) it has a flaw 
making it null and void by the force of law). 
 23. Id. art. 156, §§ 2, 7. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id.art. 158 §2. 
 26. See id. art. 160. It must be kept in mind that there is a statutory limitation for a claim under 
Article 160 of the PACP; a claimant who is successful in getting the nationalization decision de-
clared invalid or at least issued contrary to law has only three years to claim damages under Article 
160. 
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manifest breach (gross infringement) of law.29F27 That kind of wrongful de-
cision is not subject to such time limitations and can always be chal-
lenged. As a consequence, ten years from the date when an administrative 
decision in a nationalization case is issued, and at any time if the decision 
in that matter has produced irreversible legal effects, it shall not be de-
clared null and void, i.e., the restitution in kind would be not possible. 
Both the broad judicial interpretation of the term “causing irreversible 
legal consequences” and lack of time caps for the gravest shortcomings 
of post-war administrative decisions are regarded as a restitution-friendly 
resolution of the colliding norms and values.30F28 
However, in one of its recent judgments, the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal emphatically pointed out the need to introduce and maintain 
time caps and limitations of claims in cases concerning manifest breaches 
of nationalization laws.31F29 In a case involving the claims of a former owner 
of Warsaw property who, under the Bierut (Warsaw) Decree, submitted 
an overdue application for restitution in 1946, which municipal authori-
ties wrongfully accepted in 1948, the Tribunal ruled that the lack of time 
caps and the possibility to declare administrative decisions null and void 
did not conform with Article 2 of the Constitution.32F30 In 2012, when the 
case was finally heard by city officials, a period of seventy years had 
elapsed, and such an application meant that the former owner still had the 
potential possibility to regain real property. After such a long period of 
time, nullity of post-war decisions may lead to a destabilization of the 
legal order and negatively impact confidence in the legal system. Finally, 
it may be simply unjust, especially when certain rights had already been 
conferred upon a party on the basis of an administrative decision wrong-
fully made by state authorities.   
The rule of law and legal certainty are the cornerstones of demo-
cratic states. The rule of law aims at restoration of a lawful state of affairs, 
or at least of removal of wrongful acts and decisions. But the legality of 
actions of competent state authorities is not absolute and should be ad-
justed to other constitutional values. The imperative duty of the state to 
remove any defective administrative decisions, on the basis of which a 
party has already acquired a right or legitimate expectation, does not pre-
vail in extraordinary circumstances. The rule of law is constrained by its 
 
 27. Id.art. 156 § 2. 
 28. Bohdan Zdziennicki, Kolizja norm i wartości w sprawach reprywatyzacyjnych in STUDIA 
I ANALIZY SĄDU NAJWYŻSZEGO. MATERIAŁY NAUKOWE “REPRYWATYZACJA W ORZECZNICTWIE 
SĄDÓW” MATERIAŁY Z KONFERENCJI NAUKOWEJ WARSZAWA, SĄD NAJWYŻSZY 64-69 (Mateusz 
Pilich ed.) (2016). 
 29. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], P 46/13, May 12, 2015 (Pol.). 
 30. See id. 
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other side, i.e., the need for stabilization of the socio-economic situation 
as well as social and property relations that occur as a consequence of 
(potentially wrongful) administrative decisions. One such manifestation 
of this legal security is the stabilization of one’s legal situation deter-
mined by authorities empowered to act, which is then projected into the 
stabilization of social relations in a given society. What is more, the rule 
of law can be limited by the constitutional principles of trust in public 
institutions, legal certainty, and the protection of legitimate expectations; 
all of which are general principles of constitutional law stemming from 
Article 2 of the 1997 Constitution,33F31 as laid down in a long line of the 
Tribunal’s decisions. Although a limiting timeline on claims cannot be 
regarded as a constitutional right, the concept of prescription arises from 
the constitutional principle of legal certainty and is strictly connected 
with the principle of the democratic state. 
The impact of the judgment in case P 46/13 on the jurisprudence of 
the administrative courts has been profound. Although the judgment con-
cerns legislative omission (unconstitutionality of the content which was 
not regulated in the Code) and therefore requires implementation by the 
Parliament (which has not yet happened), administrative courts have al-
ready changed the way in which the law is interpreted. Wrongful deci-
sions, which for a long time enjoyed a presumption of lawfulness, should 
be sustained only after ten years, despite being issued with a fundamental 
breach of law. Stabilization of administrative relations after a longer pe-
riod of time is in the interests of public order and it is protected by con-
stitutional values even in terms of the protection of bad-faith acquirers of 
rights and expectations. 
The Tribunal’s arguments have also influenced the interpretation of 
private law rules, as they are being applied by ordinary civil courts in 
other cases involving restitution issues. Limitation of legal claims is a 
universal legal institution that may be applied to the entire sphere of pri-
vate law. The acquisition of landed property under the doctrine of adverse 
possession is recognized in all civil and common-law jurisdictions.34F32 The 
Polish Civil Code permits the acquisition of ownership by adverse pos-
session in Articles 172-176, as a legal instrument, which corrects the dif-
ferences between the legal status and the actual state of affairs.35F33 Accord-
ing to general property law, acquisition of ownership by adverse 
 
 31. See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, 
art. 20 (Pol.). 
 32. See BRITISH INST. OF INT’L AND COMPARATIVE  LAW, ADVERSE POSSESSION (2006). 
 33. Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. – Kodeks cywilny [The Act of April 23, 1964 Civil 
Code] art. 172-176 (1964 Dz. U. no. 16 poz. 93) (Pol.) [hereinafter Polish Civil Code]. 
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possession is irrevocable after thirty years, even if the uninterrupted and 
spontaneous possession is in bad faith.36F34 Polish law does not provide for 
any form of compensation for someone who loses proprietary title by way 
of adverse possession after the expiry of the limitation period. 
However, in the first years of the transition period, despite many 
inconsistencies in the changing legal environment and due to the early 
stage of the restitution proceedings, the courts adopted a pro-restitution 
approach in interpreting the binding laws.37F35 Before 1989, the Supreme 
Court excluded the possibility of the State Treasury acquiring national-
ized property through general rules relating to adverse possession and on 
the basis of the principle of public credibility of land and mortgage reg-
isters.38F36 In 1992, the Supreme Court adopted the rule that the State Treas-
ury and legal state entities (such as state enterprises) could not count the 
period of possession from the moment of the transfer of nationalized 
property to state property to the moment of declaring the nationalization 
decision null and void, i.e., the whole period of fifty to sixty years during 
which possession was exercised on the basis of wrongful decisions.39F37 It 
was also explained that possession of the property in bad faith by the State 
Treasury was not spontaneous and could not lead to acquisition through 
adverse possession because the declared nullity of the nationalization de-
cision excludes (with the ex tunc effect for the past) any similarity to 
owner-like behavior. This extraordinary interpretation of the general 
rules of adverse possession has been criticized by prominent scholars,40F38 
and the Supreme Court changed its position only ten years later.41F39  
  
 
 34. See id. In order to acquire ownership by way of adverse possession two conditions must 
be met; uninterrupted possession as an autonomous possessor (i.e., the possessor must act “as the 
owner”); and a defined period of time must lapse, id. Limitation periods for adverse possession of 
real property are 30 years, when the possessor is in bad faith, id. 
 35. Some authors claim that transitional justice relates rather to the moral obligation to address 
only the issue of the rights acquired during transition without justification. See, e.g.,ANNA 
MŁYNARSKA-SOBACZEWSKA, AUTORYTET PAŃSTWA. LEGITYMIZACYJNE ZNACZENIE PRAWA W 
PAŃSTWIE TRANSFORMACJI USTROJOWEJ (2010). 
 36. See, e.g.,Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], I CO 11/62, June 7, 1962 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], II CR 372/65, Sept. 24, 1965 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], 
III CZP 35/77, May 13, 1977 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CRN 199/81, Oct. 9, 
1981 (Pol.). 
 37. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 133/92, Nov. 18, 1992 (Pol.). 
 38. See Tomasz Dybowski, Glosa do uchwały [Gloss to the Resolution], 5 PRZEGLĄD 
SĄDOWY [JUD. REV.] 114 (1992) (Pol.). 
 39. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], II CK 274/02, Oct. 24, 2003 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CK 401/03, Sept. 23, 2004 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme 
Court], III CZP 30/07, Oct. 26, 2007 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 51/13, Sept. 
11, 2013 (Pol.). 
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As far as the rules on adverse possession are concerned, the European 
Court of Human Rights has declared complaints concerning adverse pos-
session by the State Treasury and municipalities of estates belonging to 
the persons who emigrated after World War II inadmissible.42F40 
Last but not least, as in many other continental European jurisdic-
tions, Polish law does recognize time-bars in property and compensatory 
claims. Limitations of claims is a very specific institution, whose purpose 
is to regulate real legal relationships between creditors and debtors by 
releasing the debtor from an obligation to comply with obligations not 
pursued by the creditor. As defined in Article 117 Section 2 of the Polish 
Civil Code, after the limitations period has run, the person against whom 
a claim is made may avoid satisfying the claim, unless he waives his right 
to use the statute of limitations as a defense.43F41 Equity issues play a very 
significant role in judgments concerning time-bars for claims in dam-
ages,44F42 especially in the interpretation of claims for compensation for un-
lawful administrative decisions under Article 160 Section 6of the 
PAPC.45F43 For instance, in one recent case, the Supreme Court ruled that 
administrative proceedings concerning restitution in kind (in the form of 
establishing a perpetual usufruct title to land) pending after the annulment 
of the negative decision to grant restitution (in the form of temporary 
ownership under the Bierut (Warsaw) Decree), does not stop the limita-
tion period (on the basis of the Article 123 Section 1 point 1 of the Polish 
Civil Code) running out on the claim for compensation in damages for 
refusal to establish the perpetual usufruct. In other words, referring the 
case back to the administrative authority for a new decision (after a dec-
laration of invalidity of the previous decision) does not justify inaction to 
damages claims for administrative wrongs.46F44 
Nevertheless, the most important issue related to limitation periods 
in restitution cases is the boundaries of the restitution-friendly approach 
of Polish courts to claims brought after Communism ended in Poland in 
1989. Polish civil and administrative courts have held that while Com-
munism lasted, it was pointless or even impossible to attempt to recover 
expropriated assets. This view corresponds to the fundamental assump-
 
 40. See, e.g., Borenstein v. Poland, App. No. 6303/04, E. Ct. H.R. (2008); Weitz v. Poland, 
App. No. 37727/05, E. Ct. H.R.(2009) (concerning properties subject to the municipal administra-
tion). 
 41. Polish Civil Code,supra note 33, art. 117 § 2. 
 42. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 78/14, nr. 66 item 66, Jan. 20, 2015 
(Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], I CSK 142/13, Dec. 18, 2013 (Pol.). 
 43. Polish Administrative Procedure Code, supra note 21, art. 160 § 6. 
 44. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 14/16, July 13, 2013 (Pol.). 
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tion of private Polish law that the statutory time-bars of claims are sus-
pended when the claimant had no objective possibility to seek redress.47F45 
The judiciary allowed the claimants to invoke extraordinary circum-
stances like “denied justice” to stop the limitation periods for unlawfully 
nationalized property until 1989.48F46 However, communism as an obstacle 
ended in Poland in 1989-1990. Since then, there has been no excuse for 
inaction and the impossibility of reclaiming wrongfully expropriated 
property will no longer be accepted. The courts expect a demonstration 
of actions undertaken, proof that claimants have asserted their rights,49F47 
that legal means were not available in a given period of time,50F48 or that 
possible actions by claimants were pointless51F49 or could have resulted in 
considerable risk for them, their family or the social group they belong 
to.52F50 After 2019, new claims will be barred by the general statutes of lim-
itations. 
III. REASONS FOR THE NARROW SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REPRIVATIZATION 
There are numerous reasons why the courts are reluctant to be “ac-
tive” and “creative” in restitution cases and stick to the general rules of 
review of correctness of administrative decisions upholding those expro-
priations that were conducted within the limits of nationalization laws. 
Because nationalization was generally not illegal at the time when prop-
erty was transferred, measures aimed to restore the original state of pri-
vate ownership cannot be regarded as true restitution or compensation 
claims unless the nationalization decree states so. In most situations, ei-
ther it was not unlawful under the law applicable at the time, or any 
wrongfulness was purged by time. Nationalization is not illegal per se, so 
no general recovery of damages is available. 
 
 45. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 72/01, Jan. 31, 2002 (Pol.). 
 46. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CSK 160/11, Feb. 9, 2012 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], IV CSK 510/09, May 13, 2010 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme 
Court], I CSK 343/12, Oct. 17, 2012 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CSK 204/12, Mar. 
21, 2013 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], II CSK 458/13, May 21, 2014 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CSK 42/14, Dec. 16, 2014 (Pol.). 
 47. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], V CSK 269/08, Nov. 21, 2008 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], V CSK 249/08, Jan. 16, 2009 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme 
Court], II CSK 412/08, Jan. 20, 2009 (Pol.). 
 48. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], IV CSK 184/13, Dec. 11, 2013 (Pol.). 
 49. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], II CSK 17/11, Oct. 7, 2011 (Pol.). 
 50. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], II CSK 241/08, Oct. 30, 2008 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], IV CSK 686/12, May 16, 2013 (Pol.); IV CSK 184/13; V CSK 
269/08. 
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That is why it is doubtful whether the term “restitution” is correctly 
used to describe efforts to reverse some consequences from the national-
ization of private property under the communist regime.53F51 Restitution 
programs are a subset of reparations, which are defined as a legal remedy 
from a wrongdoer to a victim. Of course, there must be no identity be-
tween the wrongdoer and the payer, or between the victim and the bene-
ficiary.54F52 Terms such as restitution, return, and repatriation, refer to the 
handing back of what was stolen, i.e., stolen property to the original pos-
sessor or owner. It is clear that various forms of dispossession are treated 
differently in law, with some covered by private law instruments, and 
others by public law.55F53 Restitution always denotes an unlawful situa-
tion,56F54 including revocation of the wrongful act and the return of property 
 
 51. See, e.g., ANDRAS OSSKO, LAND RESTITUTION AND COMPENSATION AND PROCEDURES 
IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE (2002); Mark Blacksell & Karl M. Born, Private Property Restitu-
tion: The Geographical Consequences of Official Government Policy in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, 2 THE GEOGRAPHIC J. 178, 178-190 (2002); Reiner Frank, Privatization in Eastern Germany: 
A Comparative Study, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.809, 813-14 (1994); Jessica Heslop & Roberto 
Joel, Property Rights in the Unified Germany: A Constitutional, Comparative, and International 
Legal Analysis, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 243, 252 (1993); Dorothy Jeffress, Resolving Rival Claims on 
East German Property Upon German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527, 527 (1991); Mariana Karad-
jova, Property Restitution in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Human Rights Re-
sponses, 3 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 325, 325-363 (2004); Michael L. Neff, Eastern Europe’s Pol-
icy of Restitution of Property in the 1990’s, 10 DICKSON J. INT’L L. 357, 376 (1992); David 
Southern, Restitution or Compensation: The Property Question, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 642 
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); Lavinia Stan, The Roof Over Head: Property Restitution in Romania, 22 
J. OF COMMUNIST STUD. & TRANSITION POL. 180, 180-205 (2006); Alena Winterova, Les 
procédures de récupération des biens en République Tchéque [Procedures for Recovery of Prop-
erty in the Czech Republic] 3 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE [R.I.D.C] 615, 615 
(1997) (Fr.); Gelpern, supra note 11, at 331. 
 52. In other words, the person or people paying reparations do not have to be the people who 
committed the wrong, nor do the people benefiting from the restitution have to be the people who 
were themselves harmed. See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeula, Reparations for Slavery and Other 
Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691-92 (2003) 
 53. For a comparative study of the various forms of recourse of cultural property, see Herbert 
Ganslmayr, Return and Restitution of Cultural Property, in 31 MUSEUM 62 (1979). See also Chris-
tian Armbrüster, La Revindication de Biens Culturels de Point de Vue de Droit International Privé, 
93 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [R.I.D.C.] 724 (2004) (Fr.). 
 54. See HANS VAN HOUTTE, BART DELMARTINO & IASSON YI, 1 POST-WAR RESTORATION 
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AND 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW (2008) (scholars from various disciplines suggest that government apologies 
for historical injustices fulfill important psychological goals. After reviewing psychological litera-
ture that contributes to this discussion, we present a list of elements that political apologies should 
contain to be acceptable to both members of the victimized minority and the non-victimized ma-
jority). See also ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING 
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000); Wojciech Kowalski, Restitution of Works of Art Pursuant to Pri-
vate and Public International Law, in HAGUE ACADEMY COLLECT COURSES ONLINE 288 (2001); 
THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF LAND RESTITUTION: RESTORING WHAT WAS OURS (Derick Fay et 
al. eds. 2009); Karina Schumann & Michael Ross, Government Apologies for Historical Injustices, 
30 POL. PSYCHOL. 219-241 (2009); Hans Van Houtte, Mass Property Claim Resolution in a Post-
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wrongfully taken.57F55 Nevertheless, there is a difference between the no-
tions of “reprivatization,” on one side, and “restitution”58F56 and “confisca-
tion”59F57 on the other. These notions are often misunderstood in interna-
tional literature but should be clearly distinguished.60F58 Very rarely, the 
claims of former owners are described as revindication claims61F59 or repri-
vatization.62F60 
A. No Current Constitutional Rule Relating to Post-War Nationalization 
First, under the current constitutional law there is generally no re-
versal of the consequences of the massive postwar expropriation. The 
Polish Constitution of 1997 guarantees the protection of property63F61 and 
 
War Society: The Commission for Real Property Claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 48 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q.625-638 (1999). 
 55. See PROPERTY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: NOTIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND PRACTICES OF 
LANDOWNERSHIP IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Hannes Siegrist et al. eds.,2015). 
 56. See Piotr Stec, Reprivatisation of Nationalized Property in Poland, in 1 MODERN STUDIES 
IN PROPERTY LAW: PROPERTY 2000 357-371 (Elisabeth Cook, ed., 2001). Housing, land and prop-
erty restitution processes have become a fundamental component of return, reintegration and re-
covery after wars. See RETURNING HOME: HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF 
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 275-316 (Scott Leckie, ed., 2003). 
 57. The differences between these terms are discussed in WIESLAW DUDEK, 
MIĘDZYNARODOWE ASPEKTY NACJONALIZACJI W POLSCE 28 (1976) and KONRAD OSAJDA, 
NACJONALIZACJA I REPRYWATYZACJA 3 (2009). 
 58. See Andrzej Kozminski, Restitution of Private Property, Re-Privatization in Central and 
Eastern Europe, 30 Communist & Post-Communist Stud., 95–106 (1997); see also Gelpern, supra 
note 11, at 372. 
 59. See TADEUSZ DOMIŃCZYK, ROSZCZENIA REWINDYKACYJNE A STATUS PRAWNY MIENIA 
PONIEMIECKIEGO, available at www.senat.pl; see also Tadeusz Domińczyk, Mienie opuszczone i 
mienie poniemieckie, 9 Przegląd Sądowy 5 (2007) (Pol.). 
 60. See, e.g.,REPRYWATYZACJA W SYSTEMIE PRAWA [MATERIALS FROM THE CONFERENCE 
ORGANIZED BY THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION OF THE POLISH SENATE IN THE COOPERATION 
WITH THE MINISTRY OF STATE TREASURY] (1999) (POL.); JANINA ANTOSIEWICZ, 
REPRYWATYZACJA: PRAKTYKA ORGANÓW ADMINISTRACJI: DZIAŁALNOŚĆ PROKURATURY : 
ORZECZNICTWO SĄDOWE : UPRAWNIENIA BYŁYCH WŁAŚCICIELI 5 (Wydawn 1993); PIOTR 
KOCIUBIŃSKI, POWOJENNE PRZEKSZTAŁCENIA WŁASNOŚCIOWE W ŚWIETLE KONSTYTUCJI 16 
(2013); Łukasz Bielecki, Nacjonalizacja nieruchomości ziemskich na obszarze południowo-
wschodniego pogranicza Polski, 5 REJENT 9, 50 (2007) (Pol.); Paweł Borecki, Reprywatyzacja 
nieruchomości na rzecz gmin wyznaniowych żydowskich, 9 PAŃSTWO I PRAWO 61 (2011) (Pol.); 
Tomasz Filipowicz, Prywatyzacja nieruchomości przejętych ustawą nacjonalizacyjną, 3 
NIERUCHOMOŚCI 12 (2008) (Pol.); Aneta Gajewska, Reprywatyzacja a konstytucyjnoprawne pod-
stawy własności w III RP, in IUS ET VERITAS. KSIĘGA POŚWIĘCONA PAMIĘCI MICHAŁA 
STASZEWICZA, (Dariusz Dudek et. al eds., 2003); Edward Gniewek, O reprywatyzacji mienia 
państwowego – refleksje ogólne, in PRZEKSZTAŁCENIA WŁASNOŚCIOWE W POLSCE (determinanty 
prawne) (1996). 
 61. See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 
1997(Pol.). Article 20 states that a social market economy, based on the freedom of economic ac-
tivity, private ownership, and solidarity, dialogue and cooperation between social partners, shall be 
the basis of the economic system of the Republic of Poland. According to Article 21 § 1, the Re-
public of Poland shall protect ownership and the right of succession. Article 64 §§ 1 and 2 state 
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the rule of law (Article 2),64F62 but only pro futuro as it was confirmed by 
the Supreme Court (full panel of the Civil Law Department) in the reso-
lution of March 31, 2011.65F63 Most contemporary constitutions enumerate 
property among the protected rights, albeit merely takings and not resti-
tution as such are constitutionally regulated. No constitutional court in 
Europe has yet held that the right to property (as expressed in Article 64 
of the Polish Constitution66F64) would require the restitution of the property 
taken by the communist or socialist regime. For instance, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court stated that restitution or compensation is not 
based on the right to property but rather on the general principle of fair-
ness and justice or on the principle of the social state.67F65 Also, the Hun-
garian Constitutional Court determined that it must be denied that com-
pensation may be based on the right to property.68F66 This approach 
resembles the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, as 
the Covenant does not protect the right to have expropriated or national-
ized property restituted. The argument that the Convention does not guar-
antee the right to restitution of property was repeated in the Rucińska 
cases69F67 and refined in Broniowski.70F68 The hope that long extinguished 
property rights may be revived cannot be regarded as ‘possession’ in the 
meaning of the Convention and its Protocol No. 1. 
 
that everyone shall have the right to ownership, other property rights and the right of succession 
and everyone, on an equal basis, shall receive legal protection regarding ownership, other property 
rights and the right of succession. Article 21 § 2 reads as follows: “Expropriation may be allowed 
solely for public purposes and for just compensation.” Property is irreversibly converted to state 
use. In such instances, returning the property to its former owner is impossible. If the property is 
excluded from restitution schemes because of “state needs,” former owners are only eligible for 
compensation. Article 64 states that the right of ownership may only be limited by means of a 
statute and only to the extent that it does not violate the substance of such right. Article 77 § 1, 
everyone shall have the right to compensation for any harm done to him by any action of an organ 
of public authority contrary to law. 
 62. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, art. 
2, (Pol.). 
 63. Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 112/10, Mar. 31, 2011 (Pol.). 
 64. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, art. 
64, (Pol.). 
 65. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 23, 1991, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 84, 90 (Ger.). 
 66. See, e.g., Hungarian Compensation Act (Act No.21/1990 (Hung.), Hungarian Compensa-
tion Act (Act No. 27/1991 (Hung.); Hungarian Compensation Act (Act No. 10/1992 (Hung.); Hun-
garian Compensation Act (Act No, 64/1993) (Hung.). See also LÁSZLÓ SÓLYOM & GEORG 
BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY THE HUNGARIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 108, 151 (2000). 
 67. Rucińska v. Poland, App. No. 33752/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000). 
 68. Broniowski v. Poland, App.No. 31443/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. §182 (2004). 
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What is more, the democratic 1997 Polish Constitution has no ret-
roactive effect. The same applies to the constitutional protection of prop-
erty rights that was first established in the Third Polish Republic since the 
Law of December 29, 198971F69 amending the socialist 1952 Constitution.72F70 
Also, the practice of the European Court of Human Rights does not force 
countries to return nationalized property, due to the fact that ECHR, spe-
cifically Protocol 1, Article 1, does not have a retroactive force for the 
time when the nationalization of properties occurred, because the coun-
tries were not signatories of the Convention.73F71 For instance, under the 
relevant Czech law,74F72 as applied and interpreted by domestic authorities, 
the applicant neither had a right nor a claim amounting to a legitimate 
expectation of obtaining compensation and, therefore, could not be re-
garded as having a ”possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Pro-
tocol No. 1.75F73 Hence, the Court in Strasbourg refuses to examine the na-
tionalization of properties, on account of ratione temporis. The Covenant 
entered into force with respect to Poland in 1977 and therefore, the Polish 
state may not be held responsible under its provisions for facts that oc-
curred before that date.76F74 Consequently, the Court is not competent, ra-
tione temporis, to examine the expropriation that occurred in 1945-1962 
(even if they would be regarded as breaches of the Convention but oc-
curred before its competence was accepted by the State against which the 
complaint is made) nor its continuing effects. In the context of post-war 
Czechoslovakian expropriations under the Beneš decrees, recognition of 
old property rights, long since impossible to exercise effectively, was ex-
cluded.77F75 
 
 69. Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Lu-
dowej [The Act of December 29, 1989, amending the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic] 
(1989 Dz. U. nr. 75 poz. 444) (Pol.). 
 70. Prior to the current 1997 Constitution, the country was governed by the so-called Small 
Constitution of 1992, which once again amended only the main articles of the Constitution of 1952. 
The law of 1989 entered into force stating in Article 7 that expropriation must be only for the public 
purpose and against just compensation. 
 71. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 1, protocol 1. 
 72. Tomáš Bata v. Czech Republic, App. No. 43775/05, Decision of June 24, 2008, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 78 (2008). 
 73. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 71, protocol 1. 
 74. See Jasiūnienė v. Lithuania, App. No. 41510/98, Judgement of Mar. 6, 2003, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
§ 38 (2003). For a similar decision concerning Hungary before the U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
see Somers v. Hungary, Views of the U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee, Comm. No. 566/1993, 
CCPR/C/53/D/566/1993 (1996). 
 75. See Gratzinger v. Czech Republic, App. No. 39794/98, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 202 (2002) (hold-
ing that if a violation occurred at a time when the Convention was not yet in force, or before the 
respondent State had accepted the competence of the European Commission of Human Rights to 
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Nevertheless, so-called continuing violations are distinguishable 
from instantaneous acts with lasting effects. The Commission dealt for 
the first time with the concept of continuing violations in the De Becker 
case. But, although the concept encompasses various types (continuing 
situations sensu stricto, composite acts and complex acts),78F76 it cannot be 
applied to the consequences of post-war communist nationalization. A 
continuing violation of the Convention is a situation which originates be-
fore the date on which the Convention entered into force but which con-
tinues after that date.79F77 Thus, the concept of continuing violations has lit-
tle application in cases concerning restitution of post-war nationalized 
property. Only a current administrative decision stating that property of 
the claimant was not subject in the past to the nationalization laws can be 
treated as a decision conferring legitimate expectations and legal interest, 
which are protected as “possessions” in the meaning of the Article 1 Pro-
tocol 1 to the ECHR.80F78 
Second, the Supreme Court rejected the idea of applying the consti-
tutional requirement of state liability for wrongful legislation (Article 77 
of the Constitution) with retroactive effect to takings and expropriation 
acts that occurred in the period from 1944 to 1989.81F79 The starting point 
for new rules on state liability in damages, as stated in Article 77 Section 
1 of the Constitution, is October 17, 1997.82F80 Therefore, the nationaliza-
tion decrees cannot be confronted with the current constitution on this 
matter either.83F81 There is no possibility of applying new provisions on state 
 
deal with individual petitions, the Commission has no competence ratione temporis to deal with 
such a violation). See also Szechenyj v. Hungary, App. No. 21344/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Ge-
lusek v. Hungary, App. No. 23318/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994); Polacek v. Czech Republic, App. No. 
38645/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997); Prezoldova v. Czech Republic, App. No. 28390/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1995). 
 76. The evolution in the Court’s jurisprudence from the initial case of De Becker v Belgium 
(1958) until the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Varnava v Turkey (2009) is outlined in Antoine 
Buyse, A Lifeline in Time: Non-Retroactivity and Continuing Violations under the ECHR, 76 
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 63, 63-88 (2006). 
 77. For decisions on inadmissibility of complaints see Mach v Poland, App. No.  68750/11, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016); Woźny v Poland, App. No. 70720/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016) (both cases con-
cern the pre-war state bonds issued in 1936 and interest rates. The complaints were inspired by the 
judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 24 April 2007 r., Ref. No. SK 49/05, stating the 
non-conformity of one of the provisions of the Law of 1990 amending the Civil Code with consti-
tutional guarantees of property and equal treatment because it limited the indexation by the court 
of monetary claims stemming from the bonds issued by the State Treasury before 1950). 
 78. See Bennich-Zalewski v. Poland, App. No. 59857/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008). 
 79. See III CZP 112/10. 
 80. See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, 
art. 77, (Pol.). 
 81. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 20/02, Sept. 23, 2003 (Pol.) (ac-
cording to the resolution of the Supreme Court consisting of seven judges of May 19, 2009, III CZP 
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liability, which entered into force after September 1, 2004, to facts and 
events that took place in the 1940s and 1950s of the 20th century. There-
fore, the legislative omission of the Council of Ministers to issue a legis-
lative act implementing, or rather introducing, a general compensation 
scheme and procedure for industrial properties nationalized under the de-
cree that happened before the amendment of  June 17, 2004 to the Civil 
Code entered into force, cannot be a basis of the claim for compensation 
for legislative wrongfulness.84F82 Before 1997, the state was not liable for 
damages caused by the non-issuance of legal acts against the legislative 
obligation to do so.85F83 Some other scholars claim that in this respect state 
liability for damages caused by the non-issuance of legal acts against the 
legislative obligation lacks justification even under in the Article 77 of 
the Constitution, so it could not even exist before 2004 and entry into 
force of the Article 417, Paragraph 4 of the Civil Code.86F84 The practice of 
leaving the establishment of the form and extent of compensation to be 
received up to further governmental regulations is nowadays often found 
unconstitutional for breaching rule of law requirements such as clarity, 
certainty and protection of legitimate expectations. For instance, the 1946 
Nationalization of Industry Act provided that owners of nationalized 
property87F85 would be compensated by the state. The compensation was to 
 
139/08, OSNC 2009, No. 11 item 144, new rules on the state liability for legislative omission can-
not be applied when the duty to enact a given regulation or a bill is not yet fulfilled but was estab-
lished before the entry of the 1997 Constitution). 
 82. Ustawa z dnia 17 czerwca 2004 r. o zmianie ustawy — Kodeks cywilny oraz niektórych 
innych ustaw [Act of June 17, 2004, Amending the Civil Code and Certain Other Laws] (2004 
Dz.U. nr. 162, poz. 1692) (Pol.). 
 83. MAREK SAFJAN, ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ ODSZKODOWAWCZA WŁADZY PUBLICZNEJ (PO 1 
WRZEŚNIA 2004 ROKU) 18 (2004). 
 84. See STANISŁAW BIERNAT ET AL. KONSTYTUCYJNE PODSTAWY FUNKCJONOWANIA 
ADMINISTRACJI PUBLICZNEJ TOM 2 537 (M. Wyrzykowski ed. 2012); see also LESZEK BOSEK, 
BEZPRAWIE LEGISLACYJNE 126, (2007); Leszek Bosek, Konstytucyjna formuła odpowiedzialności 
odszkodowawczej administracji publicznej, in 2 SYSTEM PRAWA ADMINISTRACYJNEGO, (R. 
Hauseret al. eds., 2012). 
 85. See Ustawa z dnia 3 stycznia 1946 r. o przejęciu na własność Państwa podstawowych 
gałęzi gospodarki narodowej [Nationalization of Industry Act] (1926 Dz. U. nr. 3, poz. 17) (Pol.). 
According to Section 1 of the Nationalization of Industry Act, “in order to ensure the planned re-
building of the state economy, the economic sovereignty of the State and to foster the general well-
being, the State shall take over ownership of enterprises on the conditions laid down in this law,” 
id. Sections 2(1) and 3(1) of the Nationalization of Industry Act identified those properties that 
could be nationalized. The Polish state could nationalize, inter alia, all mining and industrial enter-
prises in the following sectors of the state economy: mines and mining leases subject to mining 
law; oil and gas industry – including mines, refineries, gasoline production and other processing 
plants, gas pipes and synthetic fuel industry; companies that generate, process or distribute elec-
tricity or gas; water supply companies serving more than one municipality; steelworks, aviation 
and explosives industry; armaments, aviation and explosives industry; coking plants; sugar facto-
ries and refineries; industrial distilleries, spirit refineries and vodka production plants; breweries 
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be paid in the form of bonds to be issued (probably governmental bonds) 
and, only in exceptional cases, in cash. A special law, which was never 
adopted, would have regulated the issuance, trade and usage of such 
bonds. Section 7 set out the general principles by which compensation 
would be paid, including that owners of nationalized enterprises “shall 
receive compensation from the State Treasury within one year of which 
a notice of final determination of the amount of compensation due has 
been served on him” as determined by special commissions, whose rules 
and procedures would be determined by a Cabinet Ordinance.88F86 How-
ever, these special commissions were never set up during the Communist 
era. The post-Communist governments have also never set up the com-
missions. 
In those exceptional cases when the state assumed the obligation to 
compensate property losses, such obligations were not fulfilled. In these 
situations, the right to compensation is recognized as flowing from the 
state’s lack of compliance (constitutional omission). But this standard 
does not apply to omissions that happened before 1997. In this case, no 
entitlement is presumed, nor is any obligation of the government toward 
former owners recognized.89F87 This approach is also confirmed in the ju-
risprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.90F88 
Third, the Polish Constitution contains no provision addressing the 
issue of reprivatization of communist-state property. In some of the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries, legitimacy, validity and lawfulness 
of the post-war nationalization has been contested and undermined en 
bloc.91F89 For instance, the Albanian restitution law implements Article 181 
 
with an annual output exceeding 15,000 hectoliters; yeast production plants; grain plants with a 
daily output exceeding fifteen tons of grain; oil plants with an annual output exceeding 500 tons 
and all refineries of edible fats; cold stores; large and medium textile industry; printing industry 
and printing houses; (B) industrial enterprises not listed in (A) if they are capable of employing in 
the production more than fifty persons on one shift; and (C) all transport enterprises (standard gauge 
and narrow – gauge railways, electric railways and aviation transport enterprises) and communica-
tion enterprises (telephone, telegraph and radio enterprises). 
 86. Id. 
 87. For cases relating to Article 7, § 4 and § 6 of the law of 1946 on Branches of Economy, 
see Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 82/05, Nov. 24, 2005 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Su-
preme Court], I CSK 273/07, Dec. 5, 2007 (Pol.). For cases relating to Article 9 Sec. 3 of the 1945 
Bierut Decree, see Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], I CSK 441/07, Mar. 12, 2008 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], I CSK 352/09, Mar. 4, 2010 (Pol.). 
 88. Inadmissibility of complaints, see Pikielny v. Poland, App. No. 3524/05, Eur. Ct. H.R 
(2012), Ogórek v. Poland, App. No. 28490/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).See also Lubelska Fabryka 
Maszyn i Narzędzi Rolniczych PLON v. Poland, App. No. 1680/08, Decision of Oct. 3, 2017, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2017) (declaring the application inadmissible). 
 89. See Saida Bejtja & Dritan Bejtja, Private Property Issues in Eastern Europe in Restitution 
and Compensation Problems, 3 ACADEMIC J. OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES. 1 (2014); see also 
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of the Albanian Constitution of 1998, which obliged the state to issue 
“laws for the just resolution of different issues related to expropriations 
and confiscations done before the approval of this Constitution.”92F90 The 
principles and rules of ownership settlement in restitution law also apply 
to legal provisions issued by the new regime between 1990 and 1998. It 
must be noted that an even more clear but extraordinary constitutional 
provision requires “just” regulation and introduces no constitutional ob-
ligation to return expropriated or even confiscated property in kind to the 
former owners; also the compensation does not have to be full, but should 
be just (i.e., fair).93F91 However, the Albanian case is an exception. In one 
of the rulings, the Hungarian Constitutional Court made it clear that with-
out a clear constitutional provision of that kind, any statutory restitution 
regulated in the case of nationalized properties is neither a “right” nor an 
“obligation” of the state but a gratuitous act of the state.94F92 Those initia-
tives were undertaken to reverse the nationalizations of socialism by re-
turning property or paying compensation to former owners. For instance, 
the Hungarian compensation law and the scheme95F93 is a sign of state gen-
erosity96F94 and has the function of an ex gratia allotment.97F95 Some other 
constitutional courts held that the goal of restitution law is and should be 
rectification of past wrongs,98F96 but without any indication that it is an ob-
ligation of the state. In a decision reached by the German Constitutional 
Court, it was stated that a significant factor affecting the design of the 
restitution in that country was the German concept of Vergangenheits-
bewältigung, which ought to be translated as “coming to terms with the 
past.”99F97 In other jurisdictions, restitution was regarded rather as a means 
 
G. Douglas Harper, Restitution of Property in Cuba: Lessons Learned from East Europe, ASCE 
1999 410 (1999). 
 90. See Opinion on the Draft Law on Recognition, Restitution and Compensation of Property 
of the Republic of Albania, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commis-
sion), CDL-AD(2004)009, 277/2004, 3 (Mar. 16, 2004); see also Law on Restitution and Compen-
sation of Property, Law No. 9235, Jul. 29, 2004 (Alb.). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Paczolay, supra note 14, at 669. 
 93. In this case, the Hungarian Constitutional Court was asked for an advisory opinion on the 
question of whether the government could differentiate between the special restitution laws the type 
of compensation awarded, based on the type of property that had been held. 
 94. See Alkotmánybírósága (AB) [Constitutional Court], 1057/G/1990, AB 21/1990 (Hung.). 
 95. See Alkotmánybírósága (AB) [Constitutional Court], April 18, 1991, AB 16/1991 IV.20 
(Hung.), Magyar Kozlony 1991/42 (Hung.) (striking down the provisions of the First Compensation 
Law which allowed restitution of agricultural property because they deprived existing agricultural 
cooperatives of their property without expropriation proceedings and adequate compensation). 
 96. See Latvijas Republikas Satversmestiesa [Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia], 
No. 04-01(99), Apr. 20, 1999; see also Naléz Ústavníhosouduzedne 24.3.2004 (ÚS) [Decision of 
the Constitutional Court of Mar. 24, 2004], sp.zn. I ÚS 38/02 (Czech). 
 97. See Heslop & Joel, supra note 51, at 252. 
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of speeding up privatization and developing a market economy, or prop-
erty compensation was declared as a social goal.100F98 A similar conclusion 
was reached in Estonia, where restitution was seen as ownership reform 
undertaken in the general public interest and as a specific task of the 
state—not as a moral obligation, but rather as a task in building up the 
rule of law and market economy.101F99 In Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal 
identified the “beneficial social aspect” of the compensation scheme deal-
ing with the properties left beyond the Bug River.102F100 To summarize, even 
the reasoning for introducing statutory restitution schemes is described as 
being based on the idea that, once introduced, such restitution programs 
would achieve a more favorable social result than being based on justice 
or fairness, much less an obligation toward expropriated persons. 
B. No Constitutional or International Rule in the Past 
The common solution in the post-socialist states is the recognition 
of validity of the pre-constitutional law in general. In that way, Poland 
respects the principle of continuity of the state and law acts. In other 
words, the collapse of the communist system did not lead to the annul-
ment of earlier nationalization legislation. 
What is more, one of the fundamental cornerstones establishing the 
limit of judicial reprivatization in Poland is the fact that nationalization 
itself was not illegal at the time it was enacted and executed. The nation-
alization and expropriation acts were legally carried out pursuant to the 
nationalization decrees made in the past, even if they would infringe on 
current standards for the protection of property103F101 and would today con-
stitute cause for restitution and compensation claims.104F102 Today, recogni-
tion of minimum standards for governmental takings is in line with mod-
ern international law and the current positions adopted by democratic 
countries. While the provision allows government takings, it requires a 
legitimate public use justifying the takings and compensation for property 
owners. 
 
 98. See Alkotmánybírósága (AB) [Constitutional Court] AB 15/1993 (Hung.); Alkot-
mánybírósága (AB) [Constitutional Court], AB 1543/B/1991 (Hung.). The same view on restora-
tion of ownership rights to land was expressed in Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas 
[Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania], 20/94-21/94, Mar. 8, 1995. 
 99. See Riigikohus [Supreme Court], No. 3-4-1-10-2000, Dec. 22, 2000 (Est.). 
 100. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 2/04, Dec. 15, 2004 (Pol.).   
 101. See RACHELLE ALTERMAN, TAKINGS INTERNATIONAL: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
ON LAND USE REGULATIONS AND COMPENSATION RIGHTS (2010). 
 102. Compare U.N. Yearbook of the Int’l Law Commission, 53rd Sess., mtg. at 26, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001). 
FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2018  2:59 PM 
2018] Constitutional Dimensions of the Judicial Restitution  391 
First, despite the political controversies, it is the accepted view that 
nationalization laws in Poland were issued by the internationally recog-
nized government of that time. Therefore, all legislation from 1944 
through 1989 (not only the nationalization laws of 1944 through 1962), 
is still considered valid.105F103 Most nationalization laws and decrees were 
not formally derogated. Therefore, after 1990, the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal had many opportunities to examine the legality of the issuance 
of the nationalization laws and decrees (their conformity with the previ-
ous constitutions). However, it did not examine their legality, nor did it 
examine the conformity of the contents of the decrees to the presently 
binding constitutional norms. 
In an early decision, the Tribunal acknowledged that full appraisal 
of the sovereignty and legality of the Polish Committee of National Lib-
eration as a Polish lawmaker belongs to the democratic founders of the 
political system.106F104 The Constitutional Tribunal stated that the issue of 
the legality of the operation of the state, which authorities enforced upon 
Poland in 1944, today belongs to the sphere of historical and political 
judgments. Such judgments cannot be directly transferred to the sphere 
of legal relations established in those times. In other words, the lack of 
constitutional legitimacy of such organs, such as the PKWN, the KRN, 
and the Provisional Government, as well as the questionable legitimacy 
of the organs existing in later times, cannot have consequence (ignoring 
the fact that they effectively exercised state authority). 
Consequently, the Constitutional Tribunal decided in 2001 to dis-
continue the proceedings launched by the constitutional complaint to de-
termine the nonconformity of one of the provisions of the Decree of the 
Polish Committee of National Liberation of September 6, 1944 on the 
implementation of rural land reform to some articles of the 1997 Consti-
tution.107F105 Although the nationalization decrees and laws had binding 
force equivalent to acts of parliament (since they did not differ from acts 
of parliament in terms of their legal force and once introduced into the 
legal system must be ranked in the same way as ordinary acts of parlia-
ment and granted equal status in the hierarchy of the sources of law with 
the acts of parliament),108F106 the reason for the cessation of the proceedings 
regarding the challenged provisions was the fact that its binding force 
 
 103. See RECHTSFRAGEN DER TRANSFORMATION IN POLEN: SCHWEIZERISCH-POLNISCHES 
KOLLOQUIUM 19 (Josef Aregger et al. eds., 1995). 
 104. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], W 15/95, Apr. 16, 1996 (Pol.). 
 105. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 5/01, Nov. 28, 2001 (Pol.). 
 106. See, e.g., Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], W 3/89, Sept. 19, 1990 
(Pol.); W 15/95. 
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should be regarded as a “single time event.” They have exhausted their 
legal force upon the take-over of the properties specified by the State 
Treasury and could not be applied subsequently. They do not have any 
binding force on the day of issue of the judgment by the Constitutional 
Tribunal because a provision is binding within the legal system as long 
as it is or may be used as a legal basis for ex lege effect or for undertaking 
any individual acts of the application of the law, whereas the cessation of 
binding force as the premise for discontinuing the proceedings before the 
Constitutional Tribunal takes place only whenever such a provision can-
not be applied any longer to any existing situation. Therefore, the Decree 
of the Polish Committee of National Liberation on rural reform was con-
sumed ex lege by a single operation on September 13, 1944109F107 and, owing 
to that, it has exhausted its binding force upon the implementation of its 
purpose; that is, the take-over into the possession of the State Treasury of 
the specified categories of properties. Its provisions cannot be applied 
anymore which implies that it cannot be the basis for the take-over of 
land into the possession of the State Treasury any longer. 
As Sadurski positively notes, a massive involvement of constitu-
tional courts in the reparation process could be problematic. This is be-
cause strong judicial review may send a negative message, lifting the 
rights discourse from public discourse to the small world of constitutional 
experts.110F108 Also, the Supreme Court rejected the concept of illegality of 
the nationalization decrees because of the presupposed lack of the legiti-
mate powers of PKWN.111F109 This was followed by other decisions of the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal on the discontinuance of the proceedings 
concerning the PKWN Decree of 1944 on forests.112F110 This decree was re-
pealed in 1990 and cannot be applied in any manner because it is not a 
legal basis for any take-over of forest land by the State Treasury. 
Second, also under previous constitutional law, the nationalizations 
between 1944 and 1961 are not presumed illegal in Poland.113F111 Although 
 
 107. See Wiktor Pawlak, Z zagadnień prawnych reform rolnej w Polsce Ludowej; 2 RUCH 
PRAWNICZY, EKONOMICZNY I SOCJOLOGICZNY 71 (1958); see also ROMAN BUDZINOWSKI, 
PRZYMUSOWE PRZEJMOWANIE NIERUCHOMOŚCI ROLNYCH 1250(1985). 
 108. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS. A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 298-99 (2005). 
 109. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CKN 273/01, Nov. 5, 2002 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CKN 36/02, Oct. 24, 2003 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme 
Court], IV CSK 345/09, Feb. 17, 2010 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], II CSK 174/10, 
Oct. 6, 2010 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CSK 119/06, Sept. 14, 2006 (Pol.). 
 110. See, e.g., Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], P 32/07, Nov. 6, 2007 (Pol.); 
Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 8/04, Apr. 6, 2005 (Pol.). 
 111. There was a draft bill introduced by the Suchocka government in the winter of 1993, which 
contained listed regulations which, according to the government, were to be presumed illegal. 
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Article 99 of March 1921 applied,114F112 only on July 22, 1952 was a new 
socialist constitution promulgated. By the adoption of fundamental law, 
the first and most important chapter of the post-war political, economic 
and social development of Poland came to an end. The nationalization 
laws in general, and the Constitution of 1952 in particular, make no ref-
erence to compensating the individuals whose property was taken or 
seized. The economic system based upon the people’s socialist-state own-
ership of the means of production was established, as well as socialist 
collective ownership, which was aimed at the liquidation of private prop-
erty and private management of the production means.115F113 Although the 
new basic law embodied communist principles, such principles were, to 
a greater or lesser extent, imposed upon the country before its enact-
ment.116F114 
Article 99 of the 1921 Constitution contained the guarantee of just 
and fair compensation for expropriation.117F115 However, non-conformity of 
 
 112. The Polish Committee for National Liberation acted on the basis of the March Constitu-
tion of 1921. The 1935 constitution was officially abolished in 1944 and the communist authorities 
officially returned to the March 1921 Constitution, while introducing many laws based on the so-
cialist system. The Committee also stated that the March Constitution of 1921 would be the Polish 
constitution until a new one could be written. However, the Constituent Assembly, on February 19, 
1947, adopted what is known as the Small or Little Constitution incorporating only most of the 
basic provisions of the Constitution of 1921.See Cyril E. Black, Constitutional Trends in Eastern 
Europe, 1945-48, 11 Rᴇᴠ. Pᴏʟ. 197-98 (1949). 
 113. As to the economic structure, the Constitution of 1952 incorporated the provisions con-
cerning the basic economic order and provided the formal legal framework for the increased and 
still increasing state activity in the economic field. The concept of “People’s Democracy” denotes 
a state where “as a result of the revolutionary struggles and transformations, the power of the cap-
italists and landlords has been overthrown” (and “a new social system” was established. See 
KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ (1952) [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] July 22, 1952, pre-
amble (Pol.). According to the provisions of the Constitution of 1952, the economic structure was 
characterized by the gradual elimination of the remnants of the former private enterprise system 
and by the introduction of a state-directed, state-owned, centrally controlled and planned economy. 
Referring to the means of production, the people were in possession. The state established planned 
economy founded on enterprises constituting “social property,” which allowed cooperative and so-
cial organizations possess, and the development of the economic life took place in line with a Na-
tional Economic Plan as a sign of socialist state industry, id. art. 3 § 3, art. 7 § 1. It was understood 
as a direction and supervision of all economic activity by the state in the field of foreign trade where 
the state enjoyed absolute monopoly with complete exclusion of private enterprises, id. art. 7 § 2. 
 114. In the literature, the law’s strict adherence to the Soviet Constitution of 1936 was noticed 
as well as the efforts to follow the pattern of “the full realization of the Socialist system.” 
KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ (1952) [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] July 22, 1952, art. 
14 § 1 (Pol.); see also Stephen Gorove, The New Polish Constitution, 1954 Wᴀsʜ. U. L. Rᴇᴠ., No. 
3, 261-270 (June 1954) at 262 (The country, guided by “the historic experience” of the Soviet 
Union, established a socialist society and became the last East European satellite to produce a full-
fledged post-war socialist constitution). 
 115. Article 99 reads as follows: “The Republic of Poland recognizes all property, whether 
belonging personally to individual citizens or collectively to associations of citizens, institutions, 
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the nationalization decrees with Article 99 of the 1921 Constitution 
(which was in force between 1944 and 1947 according to Article 81 Sec-
tion 2 of the 1935 Constitution) cannot be the subject of constitutional 
review exercised by the current Polish Constitutional Tribunal.118F116 It has 
no competence or legitimacy to rule upon the conformity of the legal 
norms introduced after the war with the constitutional rules, which were 
in force before the 1997 Constitution. Now, they cannot be challenged as 
inconsistent with the 1921 Constitution. For that reason, the Tribunal has 
decided to discontinue the proceedings concerning the 1944 decree on 
forests119F117 and the 1944 decree on rural reform, both challenged as intro-
ducing nationalization (taking of private property) without just and fair 
compensation, not for public purposes and by an organ having no legiti-
mate competence to enact such laws.120F118 
But, even if the nationalization laws could be ruled upon, there is a 
fundamental difference between expropriation and socialist nationaliza-
tion of whole branches of industry. Socialist countries in Eastern Europe 
nationalized private property on a massive scale. Communist nationali-
zation aimed at the eradication of the entire system of private property.121F119 
Mostly, it happened without compensation, as it was regarded as a first 
and necessary step to socialist revolution.122F120 Thus, nationalization and 
 
self-government organizations, or the state itself, as one of the most important bases of social or-
ganization and legal order, and guarantees to all citizens, institutions, and associations, protection 
of their property, permitting only in cases provided by a statute the abolition or limitation of prop-
erty, whether personal or collective, for reasons of higher utility, against compensation. Only a 
statute may determine to what extent property, for reasons of public utility, shall form the exclusive 
property of the state, and in how far rights of citizens and of their legally recognized associations 
to use freely land, waters, minerals, and other treasures of nature, may be subject to limitations for 
public reasons. The land, as one of the most important factors of the existence of the nation and the 
state, may not be the subject of unrestricted transfer (commerce). Statutes will define the right of 
the state to buy up land against the will of the owners, and to regulate the transfer of land, applying 
the principle that the agrarian organization of the Republic of Poland should be based on agricul-
tural units capable of regular production and forming private property.” See KONSTYTUCJA 
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ (1921) [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Mar. 17, 1921, art. 99 (Pol.). It is 
worth mentioning that the April Constitution of 1935 overruled most provisions of the March Con-
stitution of 1921, except for Article 99 so the provision was in force also in the period of 1935-
1944. 
 116. See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ (1935) [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 
23, 1935, art. 81 (Pol.). 
 117. See, e.g., Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 4/03, Dec. 12, 2005 
(Pol.); SK 8/04. 
 118. See, e.g., Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 4/03, Dec. 12, 2005 
(Pol.); Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 19/13, May 26, 2015 (Pol.). 
 119. See CSONGOR KUTI, POST-COMMUNIST RESTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 4 (2009). 
 120. See WIESŁAW LANG, PROBLEM REPRYWATYZACJI W KONTEKŚCIE ZASAD PAŃSTWA 
PRAWA I AKSJOLOGII POLSKIEGO SYSTEMU PRAWA, STUDIA IURIDICA TORUNIENSIA, PRZEMIANY 
POLSKIEGO PRAWA (LATA 1989–1999) (EwaKustra ed.,2001); 1 Rᴜᴄʜ Pʀᴀᴡɴɪᴄᴢʏ, Eᴋᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄᴢɴʏ 
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communist takings fundamentally differ from “normal” takings or “typi-
cal” expropriation. Accordingly, the task for the post-communist govern-
ments in handling past legacies is fundamentally different as well. There-
fore, there seems to be no duty to compensate for communist takings from 
the perspective of the constitutional protection of property rights (takings 
of private property) at the time expropriations took place even though the 
Polish Constitutions of 1935 and 1921 were technically operating at the 
time the takings occurred.123F121 
In addition, expropriation was unlawful under international law of 
that time when it was discriminatory, not for a public use, or not accom-
panied by just compensation. But mass nationalization was regarded as 
the right of a sovereign state represented by its government and there is 
no international rule from those days on compulsory compensation.124F122 
This is somehow different than current international rule125F123 although it is 
doubtful whether restitution is an emerging norm in international law at 
all. The current international standard of “prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation”126F124 to foreigners was controversial in the post-war period, 
especially between the capitalist and socialist countries and in particular 
in the case of nationalization.127F125 There is no international act which forces 
countries to return properties nationalized during the communist era.128F126 
 
ɪ Sᴏᴄᴊᴏʟᴏɢɪᴄᴢɴʏ 2005 (Pol.). See also Bohdan Zdziennicki, Reprywatyzacja w świetle zasad prawa, 
in 3 STUDIAPRAWNICZE (2015); SAFJAN, supra note 83. 
 121. For some unjust enrichment theories related to redress for expropriation of property see 
Jimenez de Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property, 11 
N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 179 (1978). According to some authors, nationalization laws carried out 
without compensation still constitute confiscation. See, e.g., RYSZARD PESSEL, 
REKOMPENSOWANIE SKUTKÓW NARUSZEŃ PRAWA WŁASNOŚCI WYNIKAJĄCYCH Z AKTÓW 
NACJONALIZACYJNYCH 26 (2003). 
 122. The view was summarized by the prominent scholar and international lawyer of Polish 
origin, Manfred Lachs in Nacjonalizacja i rozwój międzynarodowych stosunków gospodarczych 
(zagadnienia prawne), 10 PAŃSTWO I PRAWO 519-21 (1958) (Pol.). See also Wieslaw Dudek, Reg-
ulowanie odszkodowań wynikających z roszczeń na tle ustawodawstwa nacjonalizacyjnego 
(zagadnienia prawno-międzynarodowe), 6 PAŃSTWO I PRAWO 972-73 (1968) (Pol.). 
 123. For interesting international comparison and analysis of constitutional protection world-
wide, see, for example, A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) and GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY LESSONS FOR AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2006). 
 124. Lee A. O’Connor, The International Law of Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Property: 
The Compensation Requirement and the Role of the Taking State, 6 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 355, 358 (1983). 
 125. See Frank G. Dawson & Burns H. Weston, Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal 
Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 727 (1962). 
 126. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. VIII (Dec. 10, 
1948) (Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by General 
Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 1948, creates a right to effective remedy or acts 
violating fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution or by law but the scope and content of 
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Poland and other socialist states claimed that the right to decide on the 
socio-economic regime is one of the sovereign prerogatives of the sover-
eign state. This right also includes the controversial right to modify the 
property relations existing at the time when the change is made, and to 
introduce new legal institutions and concepts of property law. 
The same “old” principle of sovereignty was construed in the post-
war period to impose a duty on the states that had nationalized the prop-
erty of foreign citizens to compensate other states acting as representa-
tives or agents of their expropriated citizens. In the period of 1948-1971, 
the Polish government entered into many indemnity agreements to settle 
the issue of restitution with a number of countries whose citizens had 
been affected by the nationalization laws and decrees and other legal acts 
introducing socialist reforms.129F127 According to the prevailing view, enter-
ing into indemnity agreements was not an acknowledgment of any legal 
or international obligation toward other states or their citizens to pay res-
titution or compensation for nationalized property. Neither customary 
law, nor principles of international law set any obligation to compensate 
for the nationalized property of foreigners. The Polish state concluded 
indemnity agreements only voluntarily130F128 and the lump sums were paid 
ex gratia.131F129 Neither can it be said that these agreements released Poland 
from any obligation under international law for the takings of property 
previously owned by foreign citizens. Indemnity agreements are no proof 
against the unlawfulness of nationalization laws. On the other hand, ac-
ceptance of the compensation paid out by foreign governments on the 
 
the right to redress is unclear and it does even not necessarily create an obligation to compensate 
every type of violation). 
 127. Among them, one can find the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Aus-
tria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Greece. Some of the treaties have 
been registered and published in the United Nations Treaty Series pursuant to Article 102 Sec. 1 of 
the United Nations Charter, for example: the Treaty for the Settlement of Certain Financial Ques-
tions (with Exchanges ofNotes and Additional Protocol of 25January 1973), Austria-Pol., Oct. 6, 
1970, 1057 U.N.T.S. 15973 [hereinafter Treaty with Austria]; Agreement on Settlement of Finan-
cial Matters, Can.-Pol., ¶ 223, Oct. 15, 1971, 869 U.N.T.S. 12484 [hereinafter Treaty with Canada]; 
Agreement (with Annex and Exchange of Notes) Regarding Claims of Nationals of the United 
States, Pol.-U.S., July 16, 1960, 384 U.N.T.S. 5518 [hereinafter Treaty with United States]. 
 128. See Dudek, supra note 122, at 972-73. According to those agreements and international 
custom, countries which signed them with Poland assumed their own responsibility for the payment 
of compensation to their citizens and the procedure for claiming damages is regulated solely by the 
domestic law of the states. The bilateral indemnity agreements provided for specific amounts (lump 
sums) of compensation paid by Polish government. Recipient states were not obliged to pay com-
pensation to their citizens, i.e., to the individuals who had lost their property. 
 129. See DUDEK, supra note 57, at 50. 
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basis of the indemnity agreements concluded with Poland settles all 
claims of the former owner to expropriated property.132F130 
Due to the reasons mentioned above, nationalization under social-
ism, no matter how disapproved of nowadays, cannot be regarded as ille-
gal expropriation under the constitutional property clause nor under in-
ternational law. Mass nationalization by communist governments in 
central and eastern Europe cannot be regarded in terms of confiscation or 
illegal expropriation because it cannot be regarded as unlawful in legal 
terms. Any general comparison to confiscation is not allowed.133F131 There-
fore, in the debate over the shape of the future reprivatization it is alleged 
that it should apply to both legally and illegally nationalized property.134F132 
That is also why only real confiscations are subject to judicial privatiza-
tion (restitution); that is, only those takings that were not justified in the 
context of legal acts of nationalization and which exceeded the limits and 
prerequisites for mass expropriation.135F133 
IV. THE SHIFT IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF 
NATIONALIZATION LAWS 
Because Polish legislators refuse to act, ordinary courts (i.e., admin-
istrative and civil courts) administer justice in restitution cases within the 
boundaries and limits of existing law with little room for potentially cre-
ative interpretation of the binding regulations and traditional civil law in-
stitutions.136F134 The lack of a general restitution law, imperfections in judi-
cial restitution and its cost, and the need to make a political decision on 
how to balance the postulates of stabilization of legal relations and resti-
tution to the former owners, all contributed to the change in the general 
 
 130. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 33/99, Oct. 24, 2000 (Pol.). 
See also Mateusz Pilich, Międzynarodowe umowy indemnizacyjne w praktyce sądów, in STUDIA I 
ANALIZY SĄDU NAJWYŻSZEGO. MATERIAŁY NAUKOWE. “REPRYWATYZACJA W ORZECZNICTWIE 
SĄDÓW” MATERIAŁY Z KONFERENCJI NAUKOWEJ WARSZAWA, SĄD NAJWYŻSZY, 26 LUTEGO 
2016 R. 108, 132, (Mateusz Pilich ed., 2016); Magdalena Soszyńska, Polsko-amerykański układ 
indemnizacyjny z dnia 16 lipca 1960 r. jako forma realizacji odpowiedzialności Polski za powo-
jenną nacjonalizację mienia obywateli Stanów Zjednoczonych 4 PRAWO – ADMINISTRACJA – 
KOŚCIÓŁ 134 (2005). 
 131. For the Cuban example, see Jose A. Oritz, The Illegal Expropriation of Property in Cuba: 
A Historical and Legal Analysis of the Takings and a Survey of Restitution Schemes for a Post-
Socialist Cuba, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321 (2000). 
 132. See Stec, supra note 56, at 357-71. 
 133. See Maria Anna Zachariasiewicz, Rozwój nauki o zasiedzeniu czy ślepy zaułek? Kon-
cepcja wyłączającego zasiedzenie “imperialnego” władztwa Skarbu Państwa, 9 REJENT 224 
(2005). 
 134. See Łętowska, supra note 12, at 86. 
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approach of the judiciary to their interpretation and application of nation-
alization laws.137F135 The analysis of the rulings published by the Polish Su-
preme Court reveals that the Court is reluctant to allow excessive inter-
pretation in favor of the claimants, especially if this conflicts with the 
constitutional axiology revealed in the reasoning delivered in judgments 
by the constitutional court.138F136 Some authors claim that this can be taken 
as proof of an indirect influence of the Constitution on property law and 
property relations. 
In practice, the courts have sanctioned many compensation pay-
ments for Article 160 claims. According to Article 160 of the PAPC, a 
party having suffered harm either as a result of an administrative decision 
later declared invalid, or as a result of declaring the administrative deci-
sion invalid, is entitled to compensation for the “actual harm” suffered.139F137 
In the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court we can find the assumption, 
according to which any damage stemming from refusal to establish rights 
to nationalized property must be understood as loss under the general pro-
vision of Article 361 Section 2 of the Civil Code and simultaneously as 
“real damage” pursuant to Article 160 Section 1of the PACP.140F138 Once a 
positive administrative decision is either declared null and void or issued 
contrary to the law, the claimant can file a civil action for compensation 
or restitution in the civil courts pursuant to Article 160 of the PAPC, 
which is the legal basis for compensation for administrative unlawful-
ness.141F139 Especially under the Bierut (Warsaw) Decree, in most cases, 
claimants based their claims upon the state’s breach of its duty to award 
restitution or to pay compensation for nationalized property,142F140 or be-
cause of the refusal, which is deemed to be contrary to law.143F141 Article 160 
of the PAPC was replaced by the new Article 417 of the Polish Civil Code 
on state liability in tort, which has been in force since September 1, 
2004.144F142 This only means that when the claimed damage was caused on 
 
 135. See Aurelia Nowicka & Stanisław Sołtysiński, Refleksje na temat rekompensat za mienie 
znacjonalizowane po II wojnie światowej, in STUDIA I ANALIZY SĄDU NAJWYŻSZEGO. 
MATERIAŁY NAUKOWE. “REPRYWATYZACJA W ORZECZNICTWIE SĄDÓW” MATERIAŁY 
Z KONFERENCJI NAUKOWEJ WARSZAWA, SĄD NAJWYŻSZY, 26 LUTEGO 2016 25 (Mateusz Pilich 
ed., 2016). 
 136. See id. 
 137. Polish Administrative Procedure Code, supra note 21, art. 160. 
 138. Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 6/03, Mar. 21, 2003 (Pol.). 
 139. See Polish Administrative Procedure Code, supra note 21, art. 160. 
 140. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], I CSK 112/06, July 19, 2006 (Pol.); I CSK 
441/07. 
 141. See SądNaczelny [Supreme Court], III CZP 129/09, Mar 12, 2006 (Pol.). 
 142. Polish Civil Code, supra note 33, art. 417. 
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or after September 1, 2004,  the general rules of the Polish Civil Code 
apply.145F143 
Since the constitutionalization of the right to compensation for harm 
unlawfully caused by public authorities occurred on the day the 1997 
Constitution entered into force, no basis exists for challenging the re-
viewed limitations insofar as they apply to harm occurring prior to this 
date. According to the Constitutional Tribunal, Article 160 does not con-
form to Article 77(1) of the Constitution in the parts limiting compensa-
tion for actions contrary to the law of public authorities to “actual harm” 
but the ruling is applicable only to “harm” occurring after October 17, 
1997, i.e., since the entry into force of the Constitution.146F144 Hence, com-
pensation claims for damages caused by issuing wrongful final adminis-
trative decisions before September 1, 2004, even if declared either invalid 
after that date or as issued contrary to Article 156 of the PAPC, ought to 
be settled pursuant to the “old” provisions of Article 160 Sections 1, 2, 3, 
and 6 of the PAPC, and not according to new regulations of the Civil 
Code. This is due to the transitional provisions of the 2004 Amendment 
stating that Article 160 must be used to seek compensation for “events 
and legal situations” that occurred before the entry into force of the 2004 
Amendment.147F145 Therefore, if the wrongful decision was issued before en-
try into force of the 1997 Constitution, compensation would always be 
limited to “actual harm” (damnum emergens) without lost profits (lucrum 
cessans), even if the supervisory decision was issued after September 17, 
1997. Lost profits are profits which the injured person could have ob-
tained had the harm not occurred. In that way, Article 160 of the PAPC 
permanently limits the scope of compensation claims by persons injured 
as a result of a defective decision issued by a public authority. However, 
the date of issue of the supervisory decision is important to determine the 
time limits for action for compensation for the damage suffered. 
The Supreme Court modified the consequences of the abovemen-
tioned ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal, finding that a final decision 
within the meaning of Article 160 Section 6 of the PAPC is not the pri-
mary decision, but rather a supervision decision issued as the result of a 
case review application being upheld.148F146 In other words, the Supreme 
 
 143. That means that when the claimed damage was caused on or after September 1, 2004, the 
damage must be claimed within three (3) years from when the victim learned about the damage but 
no longer than within ten years from when the damage occurred. Article 160 PAPC was repealed 
in 2004 pursuant to the Law of June 14, 2004 on Amendments to the Civil Code and Other Statutes. 
 144. See, e.g., Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 56/12, Apr. 24, 2014 
(Pol.); K 20/02. 
 145. Polish Administrative Procedure Code, supra note 21, art. 160. 
 146. See III CZP 112/10. 
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Court found that Article 160 Section 6 of the PAPC applies to both deci-
sions, which constitutes important circumstances for former owners. The 
limitations period for claims for damages should therefore be calculated 
only from the second decision resulting in nullity of the nationalization 
decision.149F147 Moreover, if the unlawful final administrative decision was 
issued before 1997, then the compensation under Article 160 Section 1of 
the PAPC does not include profits lost as a consequence of this decision, 
even when those lost profits would be due after 1997 and under the cur-
rent Constitution.150F148 So, even if the declaration of nullity or issuing in 
breach of the law was stated after September 1, 2004, Articles 160 Sec-
tions 1, 2, 3 and particularly  6 apply. Additionally, if the final wrongful 
decision was issued before the day of entry into force of the 1997 Consti-
tution, compensation under Article 160 Section 1 of the PAPC is always 
limited and excludes lost profits (including profits lost after 1997 and af-
ter 2004), even if the supervisory decision was issued after September 17, 
1997. The courts agree that there is no legal justification for claims by 
former owners, which aim to recover lost profits if they seek to recover 
damages including lost profits incurred before the day of entry into force 
of the 1997 Constitution.151F149 
Moreover, the courts take the position, in favor of the State Treas-
ury, that the amount of compensation must be mitigated. All legal and 
factual restrictions must be included which would have affected the state 
of the property if it had not been nationalized. It must be remembered that 
most urban properties utilized by private persons in socialism were sub-
ject to special public housing allocations of dwellings. Those officially 
assigned private housing, allocated by the state on an administrative basis 
to tenants, were subject to obligatory lease contracts that could not be 
freely terminated, thus diminishing the value of the property and limiting 
profits from leasing it.152F150 Former owners must also face the allegation 
 
 147. SeeIII CZP 78/14 (confirming this interpretation in a resolution adopted by a panel of 
seven judges). 
 148. See III CZP 112/10. 
 149. See, e.g., III CZP 112/10; Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], I CSK 524/08, Apr. 16, 2009 
(Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], II CSK 26/09, June 18, 2009 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Su-
preme Court], I CSK 66/09, Oct. 16, 2009 (Pol.). Compare Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III 
CZP 123/08, Dec. 5, 2008 (Pol.) (taking a different approach than aforementioned cases by deter-
mining that particular kinds of damage suffered (i.e., lost profits), can also be caused and estab-
lished after the moment in which the harming event happened). 
 150. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], I CKN 1215/00, Nov. 27, 2002 (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], I CK 644/03, June 8, 2003 (Pol.); Sąd Apelacyjny w Warszawie 
[Court of Appeal in Warsaw], I ACa 583/03, Sept. 23, 2003 (Pol.); Sąd Apelacyjny w Warszawie 
[Court of Appeal in Warsaw], I ACa 1084/03, Feb 19, 2014 (Pol.); Sąd Apelacyjny w Warszawie 
[Court of Appeal in Warsaw], I ACa 349/04, Mar. 4, 2005 (Pol.); Sąd Apelacyjny w Warszawie 
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that their property would be in any way subject to individual expropria-
tion according to additional laws, such as the Decree of April 26, 1949 
on Acquisition and Transfer of Estates Indispensable for Realization of 
National Economic Planning153F151 or the Law of March 12, 1958 on Princi-
ples on Mode of Estates’ Expropriation.154F152 In practice, it must be taken 
into account that in reprivatization cases it is crucial to establish a ruling 
on which date the court is to use to determine the value and state of the 
lost property, i.e. the amount of damage suffered. According to the Su-
preme Court, the amount of compensation for the nationalized property 
is settled at the time damage occurred and not later.155F153 
Another example is the observation that in recent years a significant 
shift in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional 
Tribunal took place, from the early conviction of the judiciary in the 
1990s that broad judicial reprivatization was possible and available to all. 
This conviction is still somewhat present in the jurisprudence of the Su-
preme Administrative Court.156F154 But even here, a tendency toward con-
straining the interpretation of nationalization laws goes together with a 
lack of will among the judiciary to question and reverse the binding force 
and legal effects of nationalization laws and decrees. The courts find 
themselves incompetent to review the laws in terms of their conformity 
to the 1997 Constitution, as well as to the previous constitutions in 
force—pointing at the Constitutional Tribunal. 
The courts are also reluctant to undermine the legal binding force 
and consequences of nationalization acts by rejecting any interpretation 
of post-war decree provisions containing announcements of future resti-
tution or compensation. It is clear that the state may also have legal obli-
gations from nationalization laws; for instance, where the compensation 
 
[Court of Appeal in Warsaw], I ACa 326/06, July 12, 2007 (Pol.); Sąd Apelacyjny w Warszawie 
[Court of Appeal in Warsaw], I ACa 405/06, Feb. 19, 2008 (Pol.). 
 151. Obwieszczenie Przewodniczącego Państwowej Komisji Planowania Gospodarczego z 
dnia 26 stycznia 1952 r. o ogłoszeniu jednolitego tekstu dekretu z dnia 26 kwietnia 1949 r. o naby-
waniu i przekazywaniu nieruchomości niezbędnych dla realizacji narodowych planów gospo-
darczych [Decree of April 26, 1949 on Acquisition and Transfer of Estates Indispensable for Real-
ization of National Economic Planning] (1952 Dz. U. nr. 4 poz. 31) (Pol.). 
 152. Ustawa z dnia 12 marca 1958 r. o zasadach i trybie wywłaszczania nieruchomości [Law 
of March 12, 1958 on Principles on Mode of Estates’ Expropriation] (Dz. U. 1958 nr. 17 poz. 70) 
(Pol.). 
 153. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], V CSK 81/13, Dec. 12, 2013, (Pol.); Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], V CSK 388/12, Jun 14, 2013 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], 
I CSK 678/09, Oct. 13, 2010 (Pol.). 
 154. See EWA BAGIŃSKA & JERZY PARCHOMIUK, ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ ODSZKODOWAWCZA 
W ADMINISTRACJI 542 (Roman Hauser et. al. eds., 2016); see also Zdziennicki, supra note 120, at 
5. 
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was foreseen in those laws and was not actually paid. Some of the nation-
alization laws contained provisions regulating opportunities to claim res-
titution or compensation for property nationalized by the communist au-
thorities.157F155 Such claims are brought before the courts. For instance, the 
1946 Act on Nationalization of Industry required the State to compensate 
property owners for nationalized property. But, regulations like the Law 
of January 3, 1946 on Nationalization of Core Branches of the National 
Economy contain neither legal rights nor claims for former owners and 
merely a promise to regulate the issue of compensation for nationalized 
property in the future.158F156 Article 7 Section 1 of the Law is not a legal basis 
for compensation claims based on the take-over of ownership by the State 
Treasury, one of the enterprises listed in Article 3 thereof.159F157 
Also, the Decree on the Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw of 
October 26, 1945, the so-called Bierut (Warsaw) Decree, conferred nu-
merous rights on expropriated persons.160F158 It transferred ownership of all 
properties within the pre-war boundaries of Warsaw to the Warsaw mu-
nicipality. The land was then nationalized in 1950. Today, claims under 
the Decree are generally granted only to those former owners who, in the 
period from 1947 to 1949, submitted an application for restitution to local 
authorities within the prescribed time. The Communist government re-
jected or failed to review many of those claims; thousands of them re-
mained still open when the socialist regime finally collapsed in 1990. Ac-
cording to Article 7 of the Decree, as a general rule the taken properties 
should be “returned” in kind by granting a legal title elsewhere, instead 
of ownership of the taken land.161F159  
  
 
 155. See JANUSZ GOŁĘBIOWSKI, NACJONALIZACJA PRZEMYSŁU W POLSCE 313 (1965); 
ANDRZEJ KRAUS, USTAWA O NACJONALIZACJI PRZEMYSŁU 20 (1946). 
 156. Ustawa z dnia 3 stycznia 1946 r. o przejęciu na własność Państwa podstawowych gałęzi 
gospodarki narodowej [Law of January 3, 1946 on Nationalization of Core Branches of the National 
Economy] (1946 Dz. U. nr. 3 poz. 17) (Pol.). 
 157. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 86/17, Dec. 15, 2017 (Pol.). 
 158. Bierut Decree, supra note 1. 
 159. Id. art. 7. 
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The Decree allowed former owners of these properties to apply for tem-
porary ownership rights of the property, which after 1961 was trans-
formed into the perceptual usufruct right to land. The Decree contained 
two forms of compensation: restitution in kind and compensation in 
bonds. The Decree compensated only rejection of the application for res-
titution in kind.162F160 If return would be impossible, due to Article 7 of the 
Decree, the owner was entitled to acquire another piece of land, and in 
the second step, indemnification paid in municipal bonds that have never 
been issued. 
On June 25, 2015, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled upon the con-
stitutionality of numerous provisions of the new law, providing an addi-
tional basis upon which restitution-in-kind of the Warsaw properties can 
be denied.163F161 The Tribunal ruled that the newly adopted Article 214(a) of 
the Act of August 21, 1997 on Real Estate Management164F162 is consistent 
and in line with the guarantees of property in Article 64 Section 1 and 2, 
equal treatment in Article 32 Section 1, the proportionality rule in Article 
31 Section 3,and the rule of law in Article 2 of the 1997 Constitution.165F163 
Article 214(a) is also consistent with the expropriation clause in Article 
21 Section 2 of the Constitution.166F164 The restitution in kind can be, there-
fore, refused in any of the following instances: 
- when the property is already used or designated for public purposes 
which justify individual expropriation under current law (some adminis-
trative courts present the interpretation that the property must be resti-
tuted even if it is currently used for public purposes).167F165 The Tribunal 
decided that if public purposes justify expropriation it is also justifiable 
to deny restitution of that property; 
- when establishing perpetual usufruct rights on the property is im-
possible because of the sale of the property to a third party or due to es-
tablishment of a perpetual usufruct right in that property to another per-
son. The Tribunal decided that claim cannot be satisfied due to objective 
reasons or binding administrative rules; 
 
 160. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 111/14, Mar. 6, 2015 (Pol.). 
 161. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], KP 3/15, July 19, 2016 (Pol.) (con-
taining three dissenting opinions, motion submitted by the President of the Republic of Poland). 
 162. Ustawa z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 r. o gospodarce nieruchomościami [Act of August 21, 
1997 on Real Estate Management] (1997 Dz. U. nr. 115 poz. 741) art. 214(a) (Pol.) [hereinafter 
Polish Real Estate Management Act]. 
 163. See KP 3/15. 
 164. See Polish Real Estate Management Act, supra note 162, art. 214(a); see also KP 3/15. 
 165. See Przesłanki roszczenia rewindykacyjnego na podstawie art. 7 ust. 2 dekretu war-
szawskiego w świetle orzecznictwa sądowadministracyjnego, BO NSA 15-43 (2013) (explaining 
the resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 November 2008 r, Ref. No. I OPS 5/08). 
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- when the division of existing property is impossible in accordance 
with the binding spatial order regulations and the return relates only to 
part of the property. The Tribunal decided that claim cannot be satisfied 
due to objective reasons or binding administrative rules; 
- when the State Treasury or local authorities erected and financed 
a building on the property and the value of the building exceeds signifi-
cantly the value of the land. In the opinion of the Tribunal, it is justified 
due to economic reasons as the provision is aimed at retaining the city’s 
ownership of buildings which it financed using its own resources; and 
- when the State Treasury or the city rebuilt the property of which 
over sixty-six percent had been destroyed. Article 214(a) was intended to 
retain the city’s ownership of properties which it had rebuilt using its own 
resources. Again, the Tribunal declared this as justified for economic rea-
sons and as an example of realization of public purposes (promoting 
housing). 
Also, the new Article 215(b) of the Act of August 21, 1997 on Real 
Estate Management was declared consistent and in line with Article 64 
Section 1 and 2, Article 31, Section 3, and Article 2 of the Constitution.168F166 
Article 215(b) sets a new procedure for disposing of old administrative 
claims.169F167 It makes possible the discontinuation of administrative pro-
ceedings under Article 7 of the Bierut (Warsaw) Decree, leading to resti-
tution if the parties or their addresses may not be identified.170F168 Because 
of this, numerous proceedings have been put on hold since there is no 
contact either with the former property owner or with his or her heirs. 
According to the Tribunal, there is an important ratio legis supporting 
Article 215(b), which is the stability of legal relations and the legal situ-
ation of the properties in Warsaw.171F169 Otherwise, the proceedings that are 
currently pending but cannot be finished by any kind of decision, whether 
positive or negative, are due to the fact that the current address or even 
 
 166. See Polish Real Estate Management Act, supra note 162, art. 215(b). 
 167. See id. 
 168. The City of Warsaw gradually announces deadlines for each property for former owners, 
who made a request for restitution, to participate in the proceedings and they run from the date of 
announcement of the claim. This provision ensures that the proceedings relate to former owners 
who really make efforts to have expropriated properties recovered. The expropriated property re-
mains in hand of the State Treasury or the City of Warsaw unless former owners the property or 
their heirs come forward within prescribed period of six months and prove their right to property 
within the next three months. The announcement shall be published in a nationwide newspaper and 
on the website of the competent authority, and shall contain information about the name and last 
known address of the former owner and request to come forward and prove the rights to described 
property. Decision to discontinue administrative proceedings relating to return of Warsaw property 
constitutes a legal basis disclosure of ownership of the State Treasury in the land register. 
 169. See Polish Real Estate Management Act, supra note 162, art. 215(b). 
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the identity of the former owner of his or her heirs remain unknown to 
the city officials. Once again, the Tribunal confirmed the consequences 
of the lapse of time. Since the entry into force of the Bierut (Warsaw) 
Decree, seventy years have lapsed—which is twice as much as the time 
limits for adverse possession in bad faith.172F170 In the case of inactivity for 
almost seventy years, it must be assumed that passivity is a sign of lack 
of willingness to request restitution and justifies discontinuance of the 
proceedings. Lack of interest in restitution may lead to disqualification of 
return claims, but, as discontinuation of the proceedings is not final, it 
does not infringe on the property rights of the true owners. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Restitution in Poland is court-conducted, ad hoc restitution litiga-
tion, which appears incoherent in some of its outcomes. It was not until 
1989-1990 that former owners of nationalized property were able to look 
to courts to regain their expropriated property. In practice, there are many 
decisions of courts related to the return of property issued after 1990. 
Many decisions and contracts through which property was taken during 
the communist regime were declared invalid and some property has been 
returned to the former owners and their heirs, or compensation for admin-
istrative unlawfulness is being paid. But judicial reprivatization is divided 
into many stages. It happens sometimes to the detriment of the claimants 
seeking restitution because decisions are made regarding only parts of the 
whole picture of a given property. Decisions issued by the courts are 
therefore often casuistic, fragmented and scattered.173F171 Thus, the possibil-
ities for deciding restitution claims implementing transitional justice rea-
soning are limited.174F172 
But, on the other hand, statutory property reparation programs un-
dertaken in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of 
the communist regimes proved to fail to fulfill “the promise of the rule of 
law” and procedural fairness.175F173 The analyzed provisions of some of the 
reparation schemes lead, in practice, to the creation of winners and losers 
of reparation, and to a breach of the idea of formal equality before the 
law, so ultimately, these schemes fall short of fulfilling those promises.176F174   
 
 170. See Dybowski, supra note 38. 
 171. See Łętowska, supra note 12, at 100. 
 172. See KatnerWojciech, Uwarunkowania prawne reprywatyzacji w Polsce (Zakres przed-
miotowy i podmiotowy, roszczenia reprywatyzacyjne), 7 PAŃSTWO I PRAWO 17 (2003). 
 173. See Grażyna Skąpska, Restitutive Justice, Rule of Law, and Constitutional Dilemmas, in 
RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM, 215 (Adam Czarnota et al. eds., 2005). 
 174. See Csongor Kuti, Post-communist Property Reparations: Fulfilling the Promise of the 
Rule of Law?, 48.2 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 169, 169–70, 181—84  (2007) (the most common 
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From this perspective, judicial privatization seems to be in favor of the 
claimants to some extent. Claims against different government authorities 
under the administrative code are generally subject to no compensation 
ceiling, and no residence, citizenship or legal-status limitations are in 
force with regard to eligible claimants. However, in the absence of a cen-
tral administrative authority, judicial reprivatization creates an enormous 
burden on courts and administration.177F175 
Without a clear policy on restitution, this also makes judicial repri-
vatization a very hard public task. Nationalization and communist re-
forms introduced profound changes, mostly irreversible, in property rela-
tions and in the structure of property ownership in Poland. By the scope 
and manner of their implementation, they also destroyed many social 
groups and categories of producers performing special functions in the 
pre-war economic structure of the country. It should be taken into account 
that such actions, restrictions and repressions were directed not only at 
the specific groups within the society (large landowners, manufacturers 
or gentry), but also other social strata, groups and professions. They 
should also be regarded as, among many others, initiatives leading to the 
weakening of the capacity of the whole society to resist the political sys-
tem together with the ideology constituting its foundation. Property na-
tionalized by the Polish governmental bodies pursuant to the 1944-1962 
legislation changed property relations in Poland, but many of them were 
present on the political agenda of that time of not only the communist 
party.178F176 Therefore, the answer to the question of whether the transfor-
mation of the post-communist societies would restore pre-communist 
property relations must be negative.179F177 The principle of past harm as a 
normative value does not offer enough guidance for courts in justifying 
property reparations in the post-communist context, because “essentially 
 
distinction made by the legislators was the one between agricultural properties and forestry and 
buildings, between different kinds of real property, as well as between movable and immovables 
properties, commercial and non-commercial ones, and between communal and individual type of 
holdings. It usually meant the difference in treatment and in certain situations resulted in unequal 
outcomes for the former owners). See also Christopher Kutz, Justice in Reparations: The Cost of 
Memory and the Value of Talk, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 298 (2004). 
 175. Maciej Kaliński, Meandry reprywatyzacji gruntów warszawskich, in OCHRONA STRONY 
SŁABSZEJ STOSUNKU PRAWNEGO. KSIĘGA JUBILEUSZOWA OFIAROWANA PROFESOROWI 
ADAMOWI ZIELIŃSKIEMU, 361 (Maria Boratyńska ed., 2016) (noting the principle of full compen-
sation was probably the reason of reluctance of the political parties to enact any restitution laws 
concerning revindication of lawfully taken properties). 
 176. See CZESŁAW MADAJCZYK, SPRAWA REFORMY ROLNEJ W POLSCE 1939–1944: 
PROGRAMY – TAKTYKA (1961); GOŁĘBIOWSKI, supra note 155, at 313. 
 177. See Eric Hanley & Donald Treiman, Did the Transformation to Post-Communism in East-
ern Europe Restore Pre-Communist Property Relations?, 20.3 EUR. SOC. REV. 237–252 (2004). 
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everybody suffered under communism.”180F178 Everybody has to accept his 
or her share of the loss and destruction that occurred during Nazi and 
communist rule.   
 
 
 178. Jon Elster, On Doing What One Can: An Argument Against Post-Communist Restitution 
and Retribution, 1 EAST EUR. CONST. REV. 16 (1992). 
